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THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
V. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
A. Keeten v. Garrison: Restricting an Accused's Right to Have
His Guilt Tried by a Randomly Selected Jury
In Witherspoon v. Illinois,' the United States Supreme Court ended as
violative of an accused's right to trial by an impartial jury2 the states' practice
of striking for cause in capital cases all prospective jurors who were only
generally against the death penalty.' The Witherspoon Court characterized
1. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing to criminal defendant trial by impartial
jury). The sixth amendment right to trial by an impartial jury requires that an accused be tried
by a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (sixth amendment requires trial by representative jury); see also Peters v.
Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 (1972) (sixth amendment requires only fair chance that jury will be
representative of cross-section of community). To establish a prima facie violation of the fair
cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment, an accused first must show that the excluded
group is a distinct group in the community. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)
(identifying elements of prima facie violation of accused's right to trial by jury drawn from fair
cross-section of community). Second, the accused must show that the representation of this
distinct group in the accused's jury is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of
persons belonging to that group in the community. Id. Third, the accused must show that the
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process causes under representation of
the group in jury service. Id. In Duncan v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court found
that the sixth amendment right of an accused to trial by jury was fundamental and binding on
the states through the fourteenth amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968);
see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (prohibiting deprivation of liberty without due process of law).
Although the Duncan Court did not mention the fair cross-section aspect of the right to trial
by an impartial jury, the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana clarified that the fair cross-
section requirement of the sixth amendment applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975) (fair cross-section principle
binding on states); see also U.S. CONsT. amend XIV (prohibiting deprivation of liberty without
due process of law). In contrast to the sixth amendment concept of impartiality, which requires
trial by a jury that is representative in character, the due process clause independently prohibits
trial by a jury that is biased-in-fact. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (due process
standard of fairness requires trial by indifferent jurors); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
(prohibiting conviction without due proces of law).
3. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521-22. The United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon
v. Illinois did not make clear whether its invalidation of the state death-qualification procedure
that excluded prospective jurors who only generally opposed capital punishment rested upon
the fair cross-section principle of the sixth amendment, the right to fair trial by an unbiased
jury under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, or both. See id. at 519-21
(implicating sixth amendment fair cross-section principle and fourteenth amendment notions of
fundamental fairness); see also McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1129 (2d Cir. 1984)
(discussing ambiguous constitutional basis of Witherspoon); supra note 2 (discussing substance
of fair cross-section principle of sixth amendment and guarantee of trial by unbiased jury under
fourteenth amendment). The Court in Witherspoon may have grounded its decision on both
the fair cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment and due process fairness principles.
See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520 (stating that jury was unable to "speak for the community,"
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juries from which states had excluded persons only generally against capital
punishment as tribunals organized to impose the death penalty.4 The Court
determined that the philosophical composition of petit juries should include the
views of the growing class of death penalty opponents.5 Since Witherspoon,
however, states have retained and exercised the power to "death-qualify"
capital juries by striking for cause jurors, called Witherspoon-excludables
(WEs), who so oppose capital punishment that they never would consider a
state law that provided for the death penalty.
6
Some authority, however, suggests that WEs, although unwilling to
and that Illinois had defeated neutral character of jury by excluding persons only generally
against death penalty); see also Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 242 (8th Cir. 1985) (observing
that between due process clause and fair cross-section principle, fair cross-section principle
dominated Witherspoon decision); McCray, 750 F.2d at 1124-29 (reasoning that Witherspoon
dominated Witherspoon decision).
4. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521. In Witherspoon, the State of Illinois, pursuant to
a state statute, successfully excluded for cause 47 prospective jurors, almost half the venire,
because the prospective jurors were generally against capital punishment. Id. at 514-15; see ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959) (authorizing state to challenge for cause in capital cases
prospective jurors generally opposed to capital punishment). The Supreme Court of Illinois had
construed the statute to empower the prosecution to challenge for cause all jurors who would
hesitate to vote for the imposition of the death penalty. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512-13; see
People v. Carpenter, 13 Ill.2d. 470, 476, 150 N.E.2d 100, 103 (1958) (construing statute to
empower state to strike for cause all jurors who might hesitate to return verdict of death), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 887 (1958). Therefore, the State of Illinois had power automatically to
eliminate prospective jurors based on an attitude against capital punishment shared by nearly
half the population of the Unites States. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519-20 (noting effect of
state's power under Illinois' jury selection statute); see also infra note 5 (giving documentary
basis for Witherspoon Court's assertion that nearly half of American population generally
opposed capital punishment).
5. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519-20 (petit juries should include death penalty
opponents). The Witherspoon Court accepted data indicating that 47% of the American
population opposed capital punishment and that 11% were undecided. See id. (adopting survey
indicating that 47% of population opposed death penalty); see also II POLLS, INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW ON PUBLIC OPINION No. 3, at 84 (1967) (47% of American people oppose death penalty).
The Court noted the importance of maintaining a connection between community values and
the administration of criminal justice. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519 n.15 (noting importance
of link between community and criminal justice).
6. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 513-14 (clarifying that decision did not affect states'
power in capital case to strike for cause at sentencing phase all jurors absolutely against death
penalty). The Supreme Court has protected the states' right to impanel jurors who dutifully will
apply state law when that law provides for a verdict of death. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 596-97 (1978) (exclusion was proper when four veniremen refused to take oath to apply
state law dutifully). The crucial question for courts applying Witherspoon has been whether
the excluded juror expressed objection to capital punishment sufficient to show that he would
never consider a state law that provided for a verdict of death. See Monroe v. Blackburn, 748
F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1984) (deciding propriety of challenging for cause during voir dire
prospective juror stating, "[i]f we had to recommend the death penalty, I couldn't do it.");
Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 677 (5th Cir. 1981) (deciding whether striking for cause
prospective juror who stated at voir dire, "No, I don't think I could [vote for the death
penalty]" violated accused's rights under Witherspoon) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1003 (1982).
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consider a state's death penalty law, can determine fairly a defendant's guilt
or innocence. 7 Based on the premise that WEs can determine guilt or
innocence fairly, capital defendants have claimed that states have no legiti-
mate interest in death-qualifying juries at the guilt-innocence phase of capital
7. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1985) (accepting that WEs could
determine guilt or innocence honestly); see also Keeten v. Garrison, 578 F.Supp. 1164, 1184
(W.D.N.C. 1984) (WEs can determine fairly whether person accused of capital crime is guilty),
rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1985); Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F.Supp. 1273, 1290-91 (E.D. Ark.
1983) (distinguishing WEs who admit inability to determine impartially guilt from WEs who
swear to serve dutifully at guilt phase, and concluding that no reason exists for excluding latter
group of WEs from guilt phase of capital trial). But see Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d
582, 592-93 (5th Cir. 1978) (upholding exclusion of two jurors as WEs, even though those two
jurors had stated unambiguously at voir dire that they could determine fairly defendant's guilt
or innocence). In a variety of contexts, courts generally have recognized that jurors may be
able and willing to set aside apparent personal influences and decide cases based on only the
law and evidence. See, e.g., Raulerson v. Wainwright, 753 F.2d 869, 875-76 (11th Cir. 1985)
(holding that, although pretrial publicity of case might have influenced jurors, jurors were
qualified to serve); United States v. Jimenez-Diaz, 659 F.2d 562, 568 (5th Cir. 1981) (no abuse
of discretion when trial judge accepted jurors' expressions that, although exposed to pretrial
publicity, they could set aside impressions and render verdict based on law and evidence), cert.
denied, sub nom. Dalazar v. United States, 456 U.S. 907 (1982); United States v. Gullion, 575
F.2d 26, 29-30 (Ist Cir. 1978) (unnecessary for trial judge to exclude for cause prospective juror
who knew name of accused); Daut v. United States, 405 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding
juror not disqualified to serve merely on ground that juror's affiliation with counsel in criminal
prosecution could influence juror), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971); Mares v. United States,
383 F.2d 811, 812 (10th Cir. 1967) (trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying prosecutor's
challenge for cause of prospective juror who had read newspaper article concerning codefendant
previously found guilty), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 961 (1968); United States ex rel. Cooper v.
Reincke, 219 F.Supp. 733, 741 (D. Conn. 1963) (proper for trial judge to impanel juror who
was wife of police commissioner in nearby city but stated that she would be a "good" juror).
See generally Hassett, A Jury's Pre-Trial Knowledge in Historical Perspective: The Distinction
Between Pre-Trial Information and Prejudicial Publicity, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROaS., No. 4,
155 (1980) (discussing bearing of juror's influences on juror's qualification to serve).
In Grigsby v. Mabry, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit distin-
guished the question whether states could exclude WEs from jury service before the guilt-
innocence phase of a capital trial from the question whether states could exclude WEs before
the sentencing phase. See Grigsby, 758 F.2d at 232 (stressing that decision concerned only
whether state could exclude WEs before guilt phase, because Witherspoon clearly permitted
exclusion of WEs from sentencing phase). Although the Witherspoon Court accepted the
exclusion of WEs from the sentencing phase of capital trials, the Witherspoon Court did not
authorize exclusion of WEs who could determine impartially the question of guilt or innocence.
See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 513-14 (state only can exclude persons who cannot or will not
consider death penalty and impartially determine question of guilt or innocence). Rather, the
United States Supreme Court has left open the question whether a state can exclude for cause
a WE before the guilt-innocence phase of a capital trial, if that WE swears to determine fairly
the defendant's guilt or innocence. See id. at 520 n.18 (suggesting that defendant could challenge
conviction on ground that preconviction death-qualification may be unconstitutional); see also
Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46, 50, (1983) (suggesting possibility of showing that death-
qualifying jury before guilt-innocence phase violates sixth and fourteenth amendments); Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978) (assuming that Witherspoon provided basis for attacking
conviction as well as sentence in capital cases); Grigsby, 758 F.2d at 239-40 n.27 (tracing
Supreme Court's several acknowledgments of possibility that preconviction death-qualification
is unconstitutional).
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trials. 8 The defendants have argued that the fair cross-section principle of
the sixth amendment, therefore, requires reversal of convictions by death-
qualified juries.9 Defendants also have claimed that death-qualified juries at
the guilt-innocence phase of capital trials are skewed in favor of the prose-
cution in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 0
In addressing the claims of defendants, courts have balanced the states'
interest in impaneling dutiful jurors and the defendants' constitutional rights
under the sixth and fourteenth amendments." In Keeten v. Garrison,'2 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether
the fair cross-section principle of the sixth amendment, the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, or the doctrine of Witherspoon v. Illinois
entitled three criminal defendants to habeas corpus relief. 3
The Keeten case began with the separate trials of defendants Charles
Keeten,' 4 Bernard Avery, 5 and Larry Williams.' 6 During the voir dire pro-
ceedings in each case, the respective trial judges excluded for cause some
prospective jurors who would not consider returning the death penalty.' 7 In
8. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 239 n.27 (8th Cir. 1985) (position that
exclusion of WEs from guilt-innocence phase of capital trial fulfills no legitimate state need);
Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 579 (5th Cir. 1981) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982);
Keeten v. Garrison, 578 F.Supp. 1164, 1183 (W.D.N.C. 1984) (same), rev'd. 742 F.2d 129 (4th
Cir. 1985) rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1985).
9. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595 (1978) (defendant claimed that exclusion
of prospective juror at voir dire violated defendant's rights to trial by representative jury and
served no legitimate state interest); Darden v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1526, 1528-30 (11th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2688 (1984); O'Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir.
1983) (same), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1013 (1984); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text
(supporting proposition that exclusion of WEs from guilt-innocence phase of capital trial serves
no legitimate state interest).
10. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750, 762 (7th Cir. 1976)
(defendant claimed death-qualified jury was conviction prone in violation of right to fair trial);
United States v. Marshall, 471 F.2d 1051, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (same); Eli v. Nelson, 360
F.Supp. 225, 227 (W.D. Cal. 1973) (same).
11. See infra notes 63-76 and accompanying text (analysis of accused's constitutional
protections and states' legitimate interests).
12. 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984).
13. Id. at 130-31.
14. See Keeten v. Garrison, 578 F.Supp. 1164, 1168 (W.D.N.C. 1984) (summarizing events
and disposal of Keeten's trial).
15. See id. (summarizing events and disposal of Avery's trial).
16. See id. at 1168-69 (summarizing events and disposal of Williams' trial).
17. See Keeten, 742 F.2d at 131 (reporting voir dire facts common to case of each
defendant). In the separate cases of Keeten, Avery, and Williams, the respective trial courts
sustained challenges for cause of several death penalty opponents. Id. The trial judge in
Williams' case excluded prospective jurors based on State v. Bowman, which authorized the
State of North Carolina to challenge death penalty opponents for cause. See id. at 131 (citing
authority upon which trial court relied in Williams' case to sustain challenges for cause); see
also State v. Bowman, 80 N.C. 394, 398 (1879) (permitting exclusion of death penalty opponents
for cause). In the cases of Avery and Keeten, the respective trial judges excluded death penalty
opponents from the guilt-innocence phase based on a newly enacted North Carolina jury
selection statute. See Keeten, 742 F.2d at 131" (stating legal basis for excluding death penalty
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addition, the judge at Williams' trial excluded for cause prospective juror,
Nancy Melton, who at the voir dire had stated that she was "not sure"
whether she could follow a state law that provided for the imposition of the
death penalty.'" In the trial of Keeten, the resulting death-qualified jury in a
one-stage proceeding determined both Keeten's guilt and his sentence of life
imprisonment. 9 At Avery's trial, a single jury participated in the entire trial,
but found Avery's guilt and his sentence of life imprisonment in two separate
stages. 0 In Williams' case, a jury tried Williams, convicted him for murder,
and sentenced him to death.2' Subsequently, the three defendants, having
exhausted their state claims in the North Carolina courts, filed habeas corpus
petitions consolidated in the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina.
22
In the federal district court, the defendants claimed that the exclusions
of WEs for cause before the guilt-innocence phase violated the sixth amend-
ment right to trial by a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community. 23 The defendants further claimed that their respective death-
opponents in trials of Avery and Keeten); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212(8) (1977)
(authorizing any party to challenge for cause a prospective juror who could not follow state
law).
18. See Keeten, 742 F.2d at 131 (reporting voir dire facts unique to Williams' case).
During the voir dire at Williams' trial in a North Carolina state court, the judge and prospective
juror Melton engaged in the following exchange:
Q... . do you have conscientious beliefs about the death penalty-religious beliefs
about it?
A.Yes.
Q.And you do not feel that you could follow the instructions of the court if you
were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the things of which you must be
satisfied. If those conclusions would call for the death penalty, you don't feel
you could make such a recommendation?
A.I'm not sure that I could.
See id. at 135 n.12 (giving portion of voir dire transcript in Williams' case). Based on the voir
dire exchange, the trial judge determined that Melton could not apply dutifully a state law that
provided for capital punishment. Id. The trial judge, therefore, sustained the State of North
Carolina's challenge for cause of Melton. Id. at 131.
19. See id. at 131 (one jury and one proceeding in Keeten's trial).
20. See id. (single jury sat at Avery's trial, but determined guilt and sentence in two
separate stages); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(2)(8) (1977) (providing that single jury
shall determine both guilt and sentence, but in two separate stages).
21. See Keeten, 578 F.Supp. at 1168 (disposal of Williams' case at trial).
22. See Keeten, 742 F.2d at 129; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982) (providing that federal
court may issue habeas corpus relief from state court conviction that violated "Constitution,
or laws, or treaties of the United States").
23. See Keelen, 578 F.Supp. at 1170; see also supra note 2 (substance of sixth amendment
right to trial by jury drawn from fair cross-section of community). At the habeas corpus
proceeding in Keeten, the defendants did not challenge the power of the state to exclude WEs
before the sentencing phase of the trial. Keeten, 578 F.Supp. at 1170. Nor did the defendants
challenge North Carolina's power to exclude, from either phase of the trial, death penalty
opponents who would not or could not find the facts impartially and dutifully apply state law.
Id. Instead, the defendants challenged only the exclusion of WEs from the guilt phase of the
trials on the ground that the excluded WEs fairly could have determined guilt or innocence. Id,
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qualified juries were prone to convict in violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth dmendment. 24 Additionally, defendant Williams, sentenced
to die, claimed that the trial judge excluded prospective juror Melton in
violation of Williams' rights under Witherspoon v. Illinois.2 The district
court held that WEs comprised a distinctive group in the community and
that their exclusion from the guilt-innocence determination violated the sixth
amendment right to trial by a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community. 26 The district court also held that exclusion of WEs created
conviction prone juries in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 27 The district court finally held that, in Williams' case, the trial
judge excluded prospective juror Nancy Melton in violation of Witherspoon.2s
Based on its findings, the district court issued writs of habeas corpus on
behalf of Keeten, Avery, and Williams and granted Williams relief from his
death sentence.29 The State of North Carolina subsequently appealed to the
Fourth Circuit.
30
In considering the State's contention that the district court had erred by
accepting the defendants' fair cross-section theory, the Fourth Circuit ac-
knowledged the defendants' sixth amendment right to trial by a jury selected
from a fair cross-section of the community."' The Fourth Circuit found,
however, that the sixth amendment did not require the impanelment of jurors
who would not or could not consider a state law that provided for the death
penalty. 2 Stating North Carolina's interest in impaneling dutiful jurors, the
24. See Keeten, 578 F.Supp. at 1170. In Keeten, the defendants claimed to have evidence
sufficient to show that death-qualified juries were partial to the prosecution in violation of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. The defendants supported their claim that
the excusals of death penalty opponents resulted in conviction prone juries by introducing
attitudinal surveys and mock trial studies. Id. at 1170-71. The attitudinal surveys showed that
WEs gave fewer conviction prone answers to questions than did persons in favor of, neutral
on, or moderately opposed to the death penalty. Id. The mock trial studies indicated that WEs
convicted less frequently than did death-qualified jurors. Id.
25. Id. at 1187-89; see supra note 18 (discussing voir dire examination of prospective
juror Melton at Williams'trial); see also Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521-22 (prohibiting exclusions
for cause of persons only generally against capital punishment); supra note 3 (discussing
constitutional basis of Witherspoon).




30. Keeten, 742 F.2d at 130; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) (creating in federal court
litigants the right to appeal from final decisions of federal district courts and granting jurisdiction
to federal courts of appeals to hear appeals).
31. Keeten, 742 F.2d at 133; see supra note 2 (substance of accused's right to trial by
jury selected from fair cross-section of community).
32. See Keeten, 742 F.2d at 133. The Fourth Circuit in Keeten cited two United States
Supreme Court cases and two federal circuit cases to support its holding that the sixth
amendment fair cross-section guarantee does not require states to permit WEs to serve at the
guilt-innocence phase of capital trials. See id.; see also Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 48 (1980)
(stating that state's interest justifies exclusion for cause when prospective juror's views against
capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair ability or willingness to follow state
[Vol. 43:431
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Keeten court noted that permitting WEs to determine the guilt issue would
cause jury nullification and would prevent impartial factfinding.33 The Keeten
court posited that even if the exclusions had infringed on the defendants' sixth
amendment right to trial by a representative jury, North Carolina's interest
in impaneling fair jurors justified the infraction.3 4 Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit rejected the defendants' sixth amendment claim.35
Turning to North Carolina's contention that the district court incorrectly
accepted the defendants' due process theory, the Fourth Circuit assumed,
but did not decide, that the death-qualified juries at the trials were conviction
prone.16 The Fourth Circuit, nonetheless, rejected the defendants' fourteenth
amendment due process claim.3 7 The Fourth Circuit determined that the
death-qualified jurors, even if conviction prone, could have set aside their
personal attitudes and determined fairly guilt or innocence.3 8 Concluding that
the Constitution guarantees litigants impartiality but not favoritism, the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's holding on the defendants' claim
that trial by a conviction prone jury violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
3 9
law); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596-97 (1978) (holding exclusion proper when prospective
jurors refused to take oath to vote for death penalty if state law provided for imposition of
death penalty in particular case); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 596-97 (5th Cir.
1978) (reasoning that WEs, if permitted to sit at guilt stage of capital case, would cause jury
nullification and would not be impartial fact finders); Barfield v. Harris, 719 F.2d 58 (4th Cir.
1983) (affirming district court's adoption of Spinkellink holding on fair cross-section issue),
aff'g 540 F.Supp. 451 (E.D.N.C. 1982).
33. Keeten, 742 F.2d at 133-34. The Fourth Circuit in Keeten discussed the concept of
jury nullification, which is the acquittal of an accused caused by jurors voting against conviction to
prevent imposition of a penalty. See id. at 133; see also K. REDDEN & VERNON, MODERN LEGAL
GLOSSARY 289 (1980) (definition of jury nullification). The Keeten court accepted statistics that
56% of WEs impaneled to determine the guilt issue would vote to acquit notwithstanding
evidence that proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Keeten, 742 F.2d at 133 n.9; see also
L. HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., NATIONAL OPINION SURVEY SECTION OF STUDY No. 2016 (1971)
(56% of WEs at guilt-innocence phase would vote for acquittal regardless of evidence).
34. Keeten, 742 F.2d at 133-34; see supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing state
interest in impaneling dutiful jurors).
35. Keeten, 742 F.2d at 133-34.
36. Id. at 133. Although the Fourth Circuit in Keeten assumed that death-qualified jurors
were conviction prone, the Fourth Circuit noted its reluctance to accept that view. See id. at
133 n.7 (noting hesitance to accept that death-qualified jurors are conviction prone).
37. Id. at 134.
38. Id. The, Keeten court dited examples to support its finding that jurors could put aside
personal biases and make impartial decisions based on the law and evidence. Id.; see Smith v.
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 214-20 (1982) (permitting jurors to serve despite employment affiliation
with prosecutor); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 185 (1952) (permitting jurors to serve
despite exposure to prejudicial pretrial publicity); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text
(citing additional precedent regarding jurors' capacity to set aside impressions and personal
attitudes and decide cases based on law and evidence). The Fourth Circuit also cited Adams v.
Texas for the proposition that a juror may be impartial even if his general attitude "affects"
his decision-making process. Keeten, 742 F.2d at 135 n.13; see Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38,
49-50 (1980) (juror may be impartial even if his attitude "affects" his decision).
39. Keeten, 742 F.2d at 135.
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In addressing the State's argument that the district court erred in finding
that the trial court excluded prospective juror Melton in violation of Wil-
liams' right under Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Fourth Circuit again noted
North Carolina's interest that jurors consider all penalties provided by state
law.4 0 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the trial judge was in the best
position to determine the true meaning of Melton's "I'm not sure" statement,
because her statement could have different meanings in different parts of
the country and could mean either "yes" or "no" depending upon her voice
inflections and her demeanor. 4 ' The Fourth Circuit, thus, accepted the state trial
judge's determination that Melton was unfit to serve on the jury and reversed
the federal district court's holding on the Witherspoon issue.
42
The Keeten dissent, however, agreed with the district court that the state
trial judge improperly had excluded prospective juror Nancy Melton in
violation of Witherspoon.4 3 In the dissent's view, Melton's "I'm not sure"
statement did not show that she would vote automatically against the death
penalty.44 The dissent argued that the Witherspoon doctrine required the
state to show that Melton had made "unmistakably clear" that she "auto-
matically" would vote against the death penalty.4 5 Therefore, the dissent
would have affirmed the district court's order to grant Williams habeas
corpus relief from his death sentence.
4 6
Prior to Keeten, only the Fifth Circuit explicitly had considered whether
the sixth amendment fair cross-section requirement prohibited the systematic
exclusion of WEs before the guilt-innocence phase of a capital trial.47 In
Spinkellink v. Wainwright,48 the Fifth Circuit held that, even if a defendant
40. Id.; see supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing state's need to have dutiful
jurors).
41. Keeten, 742 F.2d at 135; see supra note 18 (discussing voir dire examination of Melton
at trial of Williams).
42. Keeten, 742 F.2d at 135.
43. Id. (Butzner, J., dissenting)
44. Id. at 136.
45. Id. at 136-37. The dissent in Keeten explained that juror exclusion was proper under
Witherspoon only if the prospective juror stated that she automatically would vote against the
death penalty, or if she otherwise made unmistakably clear her predisposition against the
imposition of the death penalty. Id. The dissent concluded that Melton's doubts were not
unambiguous statements indicating that she automatically would vote against the death penalty
regardless of what might develop at the trial. Id. Accordingly, in the dissent's opinion, the
State did not satisfy Witherspoon's high standard of proof. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 597-98 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that fair
cross-section principle does not prohibit death-qualification prior to guilt-innocence phase of
capital trial). The Keeten court noted that the Fourth Circuit earlier had adopted implicity the
reasoning of Spinkellink v. Wainwright by affirming the decision of the District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina in Barfield v. Harris. Keeten, 742 F.2d at 133 n.8; see
Barfield v. Harris, 540 F.Supp. 451, 464-66 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (following Spinkellink, court held
that sixth amendment does not prohibit preconviction death qualification), aff'd, 719 F.2d 58
(4th Cir. 1983).
48. 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978).
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could show a prima facie violation of the sixth amendment, 49 the threat to
the state's need to impanel fair jurors justified breaching a defendant's sixth
amendment right to trial by a representative jury.50 At trial in Spinkellink,
the state trial judge had sustained challenges for cause of two WEs before
the guilt-innocence phase of the capital trial, although both WEs had
professed at the voir dire that they could determine fairly the issue of guilt.
5 '
The resulting death-qualified jury convicted the defendant 2 Claiming that
conviction by a death-qualified jury violated the fair cross-section principle
of the sixth amendment, the defendant unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus
relief in a federal district court.53 On the defendant's appeal from the federal
district court's denial of habeas corpus relief, the Fifth Circuit posited that
the two excluded WEs could not have determined fairly the defendant's guilt
or innocence as required by the state's interest in impaneling dutiful jurors.
54
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit in Spinkellink rejected the defendant's sixth
amendment argument and affirmed the district court's denial of habeas
corpus relief to the defendant. 5
In contrast, in Grigsby v. Mabry,16 a decision since Keeten, the Eighth
Circuit found that the accused had established a prima facie violation of the
fair cross-section requirement.5 7 At the voir dire of the trial in Grigsby, the
state trial judge sustained the prosecutor's challenges for cause of eight
WEs.58 The resulting jury found the accused guilty of capital murder.5 9 In
49. See supra note 2 (discussing prima facie elements for violation of accused's right to
trial by jury drawn from fair cross-section of community).
50. Spinkellink, 578 F.2d at 597-98. The Fifth Circuit in Spinkellink stated that a defendant
could not vindicate his sixth amendment fair cross-section right at the cost of defeating a state's
interest in the just and evenhanded application of its death penalty statute. Id. The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that even if a WE stated that he could judge impartially the defendant's guilt or
innocence, the risk that the juror would be biased in favor of the defendant unduly threatened
the state's need to impanel dutiful jurors. Id.
51. See id. at 592 (reporting that two WEs excluded from Spinkellink trial had stated that
they could determine fairly issue of guilt).
52. Id. at 586.
53. See id. (defendant appealing to Fifth Circuit from federal district court's denial of
habeas corpus relief).
54. See id. at 597 (stressing that permitting WEs to serve at any phase of trial creates
unjustifiable risk that WE would be acquittal prone and, thus, would jeopardize important state
interest in application of laws).
55. Id.
56. 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985).
57. Id. at 231-32. The Eighth Circuit in Grigsby v. Mabry found that the practice of
preconviction death-qualification constituted a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section
requirement of the sixth amendment. Id.; see supra note 2 (listing prima facie elements for
violation of fair cross-section requirement). The Grigsby court found that persons who absolutely
opposed the death penalty comprised a distinct group in the community. Grigsby, 758 F.2d at
231. The Grigsby court further found that exclusion of WEs, a group comprised of between 11%
and 17% of persons eligible for jury service, caused underrepresentation of a distinct group from
petit juries. Id. The Eighth Circuit in Grigsby finally determined that the exclusion of WEs
from petit juries was systematic in character. Id. at 232.
58. Grigsby, 758 F.2d at 229.
59. Id.
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upholding the federal district court's decision to grant the accused habeas
corpus relief, the Eighth Circuit found that the state had no legitimate
interest in systematically excluding WEs from the guilt-innocence phase of a
capital trialA0 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the sixth
amendment prohibited preconviction death-qualification and affirmed the
federal district court's decision to grant habeas corpus relief.
61
The United States Supreme Court never has decided whether the sixth
amendment forbids preconviction death-qualification. 62 The Supreme Court's
decision in Taylor v. Louisiana,63 however, suggests the proper analysis for
examining the Keeten court's first holding, that the sixth amendment does
not bar states from automatically excluding for cause WEs from the guilt-
innocence phase of capital trials. 6" The Supreme Court in Taylor condemned
as violative of the sixth amendment state jury selection procedures that
operated to exclude, systematically, identifiable groups from jury service.
65
In Taylor, the State of Louisiana had followed a jury selection procedure
that excluded all women from jury service except women who filed a request
60. See id. at 241 n.30 (delineating extent of state interest in exclusion of jurors who
consciously would disregard law and evidence).
61. Id. at 243.
62. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520 n.18 (suggesting that defendant could challenge
conviction on ground that preconviction death-qualification may be unconstitutional); see also
Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46, 50 (1983) (suggesting possibility of showing that death-
qualifying jury before guilt-innocence phase violates sixth and fourteenth amendments); Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596 (1978) (assuming that Witherspoon provided basis for attacking
conviction as well as sentence in capital case); Grigsby, 758 F.2d 226, 239-40 n. 27 (8th Cir.
1985) (tracing Supreme Court's several acknowledgments of possibility that preconviction death-
qualification is unconstitutional).
63. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
64. See infra notes 65-76 and accompanying text (applying Taylor to Keeten court's
holding that states may exclude WEs automatically from guilt phase of capital trials); see also
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (holding systematic exclusion of identifiable groups violates defendant's
right to trial by jury drawn from fair cross-section of community); Keeten, 742 F.2d at 133-34
(states may exclude WEs systematically from guilt-innocence phase of capital trials).
65. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (holding that systematic exclusion of identifiable groups violated
defendant's right to trial by fair cross-section of community); see also supra note 2 (giving
elements of fair cross-section violation). Although the Supreme Court decided Taylor in the
context of systematic exclusion of women from a grand venire, Taylor's fair cross-section
analysis applies also to the voir dire stage of jury selection. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519-
20 (invalidating state voir dire procedure on fair cross-section grounds); see also McCray v.
Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1129 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that Witherspoon progeny suggests that
fair cross-section requirement applies to voir dire stage of jury selection). A state's compliance
with the fair cross-section requirement does not depend upon whether the state excludes
prospective jurors from grand venires or from petit juries, but whether the challenged jury
selection procedure is random in character. See McCray, 750 F.2d at 1124-27 (observing that,
although courts have applied fair cross-section principle in various contexts, focus of each
court's analysis has been whether challenged jury selection practice precluded possibility of
impaneling truly representative jury); see also Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (stating that random
draw is essential to guard against exercise of arbitrary state power by interposing sense of the
community between state and accuseds); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982) (creating federal right to
trial by petit jury randomly selected from fair cross-section of community).
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for eligibility to serve. 66 An all male jury drawn from an all male venire
convicted the accused. 67 The Supreme Court in Taylor reversed the accused's
conviction because Louisiana's selection procedure, effecting systematic ex-
clusion of women, violated the accused's right to trial by a jury drawn from
a fair cross-section of the community. 6s The Taylor Court found that the
fair cross-section principle of the sixth amendment, in contrast to the
fourteenth amendment due process claim that trial by a conviction prone
jury was unfair, required no showing of actual bias. 69 Instead, the Taylor
Court found that the fair cross-section principle simply protected an accused's
sixth amendment right to trial by a randomly selected jury.
70
To guard the right of criminal defendants to trial by a randomly selected
jury, the Supreme Court has invalidated state jury selection procedures that
manipulated the random draw to exclude systematically from jury service
members of ascertainable groups in the community.7' The Keeten decision,
though, empowers states bound by Fourth Circuit decisions to exclude
systematically a class of qualified jurors, WEs, from determining a defend-
ant's guilt or innocence.7 2 The Supreme Court, however, has left no doubt
66. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 523, 525-26 (describing Louisiana's jury selection procedure
that excluded women from jury service).
67. See id. at 524-26 (all male jury convicted accused in Taylor).
68. See id. at 538 (Taylor Court reversing conviction on sixth amendment grounds).
69. See id. at 530. Compare infra notes 78-88 and accompanying text (discussing claim
that conviction prone jury was biased in violation of due process clause of fourteenth amend-
ment) with infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (discussing sixth amendment goal of trial
by representative jury, a goal pursued by enforcing random jury selection procedures); see also
supra note 2 (distinguishing accused's right to trial by jury drawn from fair cross-section of
community under sixth amendment from accused's right to trial by unbiased jury under due
process clause of fourteenth amendment).
70. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538. The United States Supreme Court has determined that
the guarantee of trial by a randomly selected jury is basic to a democratic society and should
hedge the public's common sense judgment against overzealous prosecutors and mistaken
judges. Glasser v. United States 315 U.S. 60, 85-86 (1942); see Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128,
130 (1940) (stating exclusion of groups from jury service is inconsistent with democratic society
and representative government). Recognizing the fundamental nature of the right, the Supreme
Court in Taylor clarified that the fair cross-section principle of the sixth amendment applied to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530; see Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (sixth amendment right to trial by impartial jury binding on states
through fourteenth amendment).
71. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-64, 372 (1979) (striking down state
statute that exempted women from jury duty); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502-04 (1972)
(stating that discriminatory jury selection by states threatens integrity of judicial process); Carter
v. Jury Comm'n. of Green Cty., 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970) (noting that exclusion of blacks from
jury service contravenes idea of jury as body truly representative of community); cf. Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 191 (1946) (exercising its supervisory power, Court held that
exclusion of women from jury service undermined federal design to make juries representative
of community).
72. See Keeten, 742 F.2d at 133-34 (holding that states may death-qualify juries before
guilt-innocence phase of capital trial); see also supra note 17 (North Carolina death-qualification
statute authorizing exclusion of WEs for cause).
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that a state may create reasonable exemptions from the fair cross-section
principle, as long as the state tailors its laws authorizing systematic exclusion
of jurors to fit legitimate state interests. 73 Because the state interest is in
impaneling jurors who dutifully will find the facts and apply state law,74 and
because WEs may swear to serve dutifully at the guilt-innocence phase of a
capital trial, 75 preconviction death-qualification arguably advances no legiti-
mate state interest. 76 Therefore, under Taylor's scheme prohibiting systematic
exclusion of jurors absent a legitimate state interest, the Keeten court
incorrectly held that North Carolina's systematic exclusion of WEs from the
guilt-innocence determination was consistent with the fair cross-section re-
quirement of the sixth amendment.
Although the Keeten court incorrectly rejected the defendant's fair cross-
section claim, the weight of authority indicates that the Keeten court correctly
rejected the defendants' second claim, that the death-qualified juries were
biased against the defendants in violation of due process principles of
fairness. 77 In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court
indicated that a defendant successfully might challenge his conviction by a
death-qualified jury on due process grounds by producing evidence sufficient
to show that death-qualified juries favored conviction. 78 Capital defendants
answered the Supreme Court's invitation with claims that death-qualified juries
were conviction prone and, therefore, the accused's trial was unfair under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 79 At first, the federal
courts rejected the due process argument on the ground that the accused failed
to produce evidence sufficient to show that the jury was conviction prone. 0
In more recent decisions, however, the federal courts have bypassed the fac-
73. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (noting that states may create
reasonable exemptions in jury selection procedures); see also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,
370 (1979) (noting that state must confine exemptions in jury selection procedures to legitimate
state interests); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1129 (2d Cir. 1984) (state may not restrict
unreasonably fair chance that petit jury will be representative of community).
74. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595-96 (1978) (noting state interest that jurors
take oath to find facts impartially and apply state law faithfully).
75. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing juror's ability to set aside personal
attitudes and fairly find facts).
76. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text (analyzing defendants' sixth amendment
right to trial by randomly selected jury relative to state interest in impaneling dutiful jurors).
77. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text (noting cases in which courts have found
that trial by death-qualified jury did not violate due process fair trial requirement).
78. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516-18 (suggesting that future defendants may produce
evidence sufficient to show that death-qualified jury was conviction prone in violation of due
process right to trial by unbiased jury); see also supra note 2 (distinguishing protection of right
to trial by unbiased jury under due process clause from protection of right to trial by jury
drawn from fair cross-section of community under sixth amendment).
79. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750, 762 (7th Cir. 1976)
(holding that death-qualified juries not unfair at guilt-innocence phase of capital trial), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977); Bailey v. United States, 405 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(same); Taylor v. Slayton, 341 F.Supp. 489, 491 (W.D. Va. 1972) (same).
80. See, e.g., United States ex reL Townsend v. Twomey, 452 F.2d 350, 362-63 (7th Cir.
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tual question whether a jury was conviction prone and, instead, have held
that trial by a conviction prone jury does not offend the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment."'
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Rowan v. Owens9 2 is an example of
the decisions holding that trial by a conviction prone jury does not offend
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.83 At trial in Rowan,
the state trial judge excused WEs at the voir dire before the guilt-innocence
phase of a capital trial. 4 The resulting jury found the defendant guilty of
capital murder,8 and the defendant sought reversal of the conviction by
filing a petition for habeas corpus in a federal district court.8 6 In upholding
the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief, the Seventh Circuit in
Rowan reasoned that the proper question was not whether the death-qualified
jury was less sympathetic to the accused, but whether the jury was likely to
convict an innocent man.' The Seventh Circuit held that a death-qualified
jury, even if conviction prone, could mediate fairly between the accused and
the prosecution on the issue of guilt. 8
The Fourth Circuit in Keeten has followed the approach that Rowan v.
Owens exemplifies. 9 By assuming that death-qualified juries were conviction
prone, but, nonetheless, upholding the convictions, the Keeten court has
foreclosed in the Fourth Circuit the fourteenth amendment due process
argument that a defendant can invalidate his conviction by showing that the
petit jury was prone to convict2 ° In contrast to the Witherspoon Court's
suggestion that a defendant may present statistical data sufficient to prove
1972) (holding that defendant failed to produce evidence sufficient to show jury was conviction
prone), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972) Bailey v. United States, 405 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (same); Craig v. WVyse, 373 F.Supp. 1008, 1011 (D. Colo. 1974) (same).
81. See, e.g, Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 578-79 (5th Cir. 1981) (trial of guilt by
death-qualified jury, even if jury was conviction prone, does not offend due process clause);
Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 848 (10th Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980);
United States ex rel. Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750, 761-62 (7th Cir. 1976) (same).
82. 752 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1984)
83. See id. at 1190-91 (conviction prone jury can mediate impartially between prosecutor
and accused); see also supra note 81 and accompanying text (trial by conviction prone jury does
not offend due process clause).
84. See Rowan, 752 F.2d at 1190 (reporting state trial judge's exclusion of WEs at voir
dire).
85. See id. at 1187 (conviction of defendant in Rowan by death qualified jury).
86. See id. (defendant in Rowan petitioning for habeas corpus relief in federal district
court).
87. Id. at 1190-91.
88. Id.
89. Compare id. (conviction prone jury can mediate fairly between prosecutor and accused)
with supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit in Keeten holding that trial by
conviction prone jury does not violate due process clause).
90. See Keeten, 742 F.2d at 132 (Fourth Circuit in Keeten holding that trial by conviction
prone jury does not violate due process clause). But cf. supra note 78 and accompanying text
(Witherspoon Court indicating that defendant could show jury was conviction prone in violation
of due process clause).
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unfair jury bias, virtually no quantum of empirical data can suffice to prove
unfair bias under Keeten.9l Therefore, the Keeten court's holding on the
conviction proneness theory treats Witherspoon's invitation not as a new
due process approach employing statistical tendencies to challenge a convic-
tion, but as the old ground that an accused must prove specific bias of an
individual juror to implicate the fair trial element of due process.
92
The dissent in Keeten correctly disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's third
holding, that the trial judge correctly sustained the challenge for cause of
Nancy Melton, who had stated that she was "not sure" whether she could
return a verdict of death. 93 When the Fourth Circuit decided Keeten, the
Witherspoon doctrine prohibited exclusion for cause of death penalty op-
ponents unless a prosecutor could show through voir dire questioning that a
death penalty opponent had made "unmistakably clear" that he "automat-
ically" would vote against a verdict of death. 9' The Supreme Court in Adams
v. Texas,95 for example, held exclusions of prospective jurors improper, even
though the excluded jurors had admitted at the voir dire that the possibility
of capital punishment would "affect" their honest judgment of the facts. 96
In short, the Witherspoon doctrine had come to require prosecutors to show
that excluded jurors were absolutely biased against the state. 97 Only then
would a defendant's Witherspoon rights yield to the state's interest in
impaneling fair jurors.
98
The Fourth Circuit in Keeten, however, stressing North Carolina's
interest in disqualifying even equivocating jurors, 99 signaled a critical depar-
91. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (noting Keeten court holding that trial
by conviction prone jury does not violate right to trial by unbiased jury under due process
clause, because conviction prone jury can determine issue of guilt or innocence fairly).
92. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text (violation of right to trial by unbiased
jury under due process requires showing of actual bias); supra note 2 (due process standard of
fairness requires trial by indifferent jurors).
93. See Keeten, 742 F.2d at 135 (Butzner, J. dissenting); see also Witherspoon, 391 U.S.
at 521 (state may exclude from sentencing phase only absolute opponents of death penalty);
Keeten, 742 F.2d at 135 (upholding exclusion of Nancy Melton, who was "not sure" whether
she could return death verdict); see also Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 265 (1970) (reading
Witherspoon to require state to show juror's "unambiguous" purpose to vote "automatically"
against death penalty); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 482 (1969) (same); see also infra
notes 94-98 and accompanying text (assessment of Witherspoon doctrine when Fourth Circuit
decided Keeten).
94. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521-22 (on appeal, state must show the excluded juror
made unmistakably clear that he absolutely opposed capital punishment).
95. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
96. Id. at 49. The Supreme Court in Adams v. Texas found that a juror admitting that
the possibility of the death penalty would affect his judgment of the facts meant only that he
would deliberate more seriously. Id. The Court concluded that impanelment of jurors appreci-
ating the seriousness of their task did not undermine the state's interest in having dutiful jurors.
Id. at 50-51.
97. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (describing Witherspoon's high standard
of proof).
98. Id.
99. See Keeten, 742 F.2d at 133 (stressing state interest in excluding equivocating death
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ture from Witherspoon's high standard of proof.100 By holding that a state
could exclude for cause even an equivocating death penalty opponent, the
Fourth Circuit in Keeten implied that trial courts could sustain challenges for
cause almost as readily as trial courts had done before Witherspoon.' '
Since Keeten, the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt"'
also has accepted a greatly weakened standard of proof and standard of review
in Witherspoon cases.'0 3 At trial in Witt, a Florida state trial judge excluded
as a WE a prospective juror who thought that her personal beliefs against
the death penalty would interfere with her ability to serve dutifully on the
jury.'"" The resulting jury convicted the accused for murder.'1 5 Affirming the
conviction, the Supreme Court held that a trial judge, notwithstanding the
sixth and fourteenth amendments, should exclude a person whose views of
capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair" his or her dutiful
penalty opponents); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text (Keeten's court's reasoning
concerning state interest).
100. See infra note 99-108 and accompanying text (analysis of effect of Keeten and Witt
on Witherspoon doctrine).
101. See Keeten, 742 F.2d at 133; see also Turberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411, 421
(D.C. Cir. 1962) (deferring to decision of trial judge to exclude for cause juror who at voir dire
expressed reservations about imposing death penalty), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 946 (1962); United
States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171, 180-81 (2d Cir.) (no reversible error to exclude death penalty
opponent even if grounds for exclusion insufficient), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 963 (1954); supra
note 25 and accompanying text (conditions of Nancy Melton's exclusion); note 4 and accom-
panying text (Illinois practice invalidated in Witherspoon); supra notes 94-99 and accompanying
text (Witherspoon's standard of proof).
102. 105 S.Ct. 844 (1985)
103. See id. at 852 (articulating "prevent or substantially impair" standard for excluding
prospective jurors); infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (standards of proof and review
under Wainwright v. Witt).
104. See Witt, 105 S.Ct. at 848. In Wainwright v. Witt, the prosecutor and the excluded
prospective juror engaged in the following exchange during the voir dire:
Q. [prosecutor:] Now, let me ask you a question, ma'am. Do you have any religious
beliefs or personal beliefs against the death penalty?
A. [Colby:] I am afraid personally but not-
Q.Speak up, please.
A.I am afraid of being a little personal, but definitely not religious.
Q.Now, would that interfere with you sitting as a juror in this case?
A.I am afraid it would.
Q.You are afraid it would?
A.Yes, Sir.
Q.Would it interfere with judging the guilt or innocence of the Defendant in this
case?
A.I think so.
Q.You think it would.
A.I think it would.
Q.Your honor, I would move for cause at this point.
THE COURT: All right. Step down.
Id. Compare id. (portion of voir dire transcript in Witt) with supra note 18 (portion of voir
dire transcript at Williams' trial in Keeten).
105. See Witt, 105 S.Ct. at 847-48 (conviction of defendant in Witt).
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performance as a juror. ' The Witt Court held that, in all cases, whether
a person is fit to serve as a juror is a factual issue subject to the federal statute
that requires federal appellate courts to presume the correctness of any district
court finding of fact.'0 7 Therefore, under Witt, in contrast to Witherspoon's
high standard of proof, a trial judge confidently may exclude a death penalty
opponent of any degree from jury service if the judge reasonably believes that
the prospective juror is unlikely to obey the instructions of the court.'0 '
The new standards under Witt empower states to exclude from the
sentencing phase of capital trials a larger class of death penalty opponents,
including persons perhaps only mildly against capital punishment.1 9 More
subtly, states bound by the Fourth Circuit's decision in Keeten and the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Spinkellink now may exclude the new, larger class of
WEs from the guilt-innocence as well as the sentencing phase of capital
trials, because Keeten and Spinkellink permit automatic exclusion of WEs
from both phases."10 On the other hand, although courts bound by Grigsby
may not exclude WEs automatically from the guilt-innocence phase, those
courts should recognize, nonetheless, that an accused's right to have his guilt
tried by a randomly selected jury is not absolute."' The Supreme Court in
Witt v. Wainwright noted that its "prevent or substantially impair" standard
applies to both the guilt-innocence and the sentencing phases of capital
106. Id. at 852.
107. See id. at 853-55 (holding that whether person is qualified to serve as juror is factual
issue entitled to presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)); see also 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d) (1982) (providing that factual issues determined by state courts of competent jurisdiction
and reviewed in federal habeas proceedings are presumptively correct). Under Witt, federal
courts in Witherspoon cases must afford broad discretion to a state trial judge's factual
determination of whether a prospective juror was excludable as a WE. Wit!, 105 S.Ct. at 854.
The Supreme Court in Witt reasoned that, although trial judges have difficulty separating
questions of fact from mixed questions of law and fact for § 2254(d) purposes, excluding WEs
as unfit to determine sentence is no different than excluding jurors for innumerable other
reasons. See id. at 855; see also Patton v. Yount, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2891 (1984) (reasoning that
determining prospective juror's fitness to serve based upon prospective juror's demeanor and
credibility at voir dire is peculiarly within trial judge's province).
108. See Witt, 105 S.Ct. at 852 (articulating "prevent or substantially impair" standard);
see also supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text (comparing Witherspoon's original standards
to relaxed standards under Witt). The Witt Court outlined the procedure that a trial court
should follow to determine whether exclusion for cause is proper. See Witt, 105 S.Ct. at 852.
The state should show through voir dire questioning that the prospective juror lacks impartiality.
Id. Then, the trial judge should determine whether the challenge is proper according to the
"prevent or substantially impair" standard. Id.
109. See supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text (comparing relaxed standards under
Witt to Witherspoon's originally strict standards of proof and review).
110. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (Keeten court holding that preconviction
death-qualification does not offend Constitution); supra notes 49-50 and accompaying text
(Spinkellink court holding that preconviction death-qualification does not offend constitution).
I 11. See infra note 103-08 and accompanying text (WEs excludable from guilt-innocence
phase if views would "prevent or substantially impair" ability to dutifully serve at guilt-
innocence phase).
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trials." 2 Therefore, under Witt, trial courts may exclude even from the guilt-
innocence phase WEs who simply appear unable or unwilling to determine
fairly guilt or innocence."' In capital cases in which WEs appear able and
willing fairly to determine guilt or innocence, however, courts outside the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits should find that impaneling WEs to sit at the
guilt-innocence phase of trial does not undermine the states' legitimate
interest in impaneling dutiful jurors." 
4
In Keeten v. Garrison, the Fourth Circuit, in a consolidated habeas
corpus appeal, rejected the defendants' theories that death-qualification
before conviction violated their right under the sixth amendment fair cross-
section requirement,' and that trial by the resulting conviction prone juries
violated fairness notions of the fourteenth amendment due process clause ."6
The Fourth Circuit also rejected a claim that the exclusion for cause of a
prospective juror who was unsure whether she could consider a state death
penalty law violated the Witherspoon doctrine." 7 In each of its three holdings,
the Fourth Circuit warned that permitting death penalty opponents to
participate as jurors in capital trials would threaten a state's legitimate
interest in impaneling dutiful jurors."8 Supreme Court precedent construing
the sixth amendment coupled with a collection of cases suggesting that WEs
can determine fairly guilt or innocence, however, indicates that the systematic
exclusion of WEs from the guilt-innocence phase of a capital trial serves no
legitimate state purpose and, therefore, violates the sixth amendment to the
Constitution." 9 Because the decisions of Witt and Keeten will effect a larger
class of WEs, 20 and because federal courts have rejected the theory that
conviction prone juries are unconstitutionally biased,' 2' the sixth amendment
112. Witt, 105 S.Ct. at 851.
113. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text (discussing standards for proper
exclusion under Witt).
114. See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text (analysis suggesting that sixth amendment
prohibits systematic exclusions of WEs from guilt-innocence phase).
115. See supra -note 33 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit in Keeten found that threat
of jury nullification and juror bias against state preempted sixth amendment right).
116. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit assumed death-qualified
jurors were conviction prone, but found that conviction prone jurors could determine fairly
guilt or innocence).
117. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit deferred to trial judge's
determination because trial judge was in best position to determine true meaning of Melton's
"I'm not sure" statements).
118. See supra notes 33 & 44 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit stressed North
Carolina's interest in having dutiful jurors).
119. See supra notes 63-76 and accompanying text (tracing Supreme Court fair cross-
section holdings to suggest that systematic exclusion of WEs from determining defendant's guilt
violates Constitution).
120. See supra notes 103-110 and accompany text (discussing that weakened standard of
Witherspoon will result in increased exclusions of WEs).
121. See supra notes 6, 78-89 and accompanying text (conviction prone jurors may
determine fairly defendant's guilt or innocence).
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right of an accused to have his guilt determined by a randomly selected jury
stands alone to prevent the exclusion of even only moderate opponents to
the death penalty from the guilt-innocence phase of a capital trial. As fair
cross-section litigation increases, courts should recognize that allowing WEs
to determine a defendant's guilt or innocence in capital cases protects a
constitutional guarantee without compromising a state's legitimate interest
in impaneling dutiful jurors.
2 2
MIcHAEL A. KING
B. The Consequences of Appealing Plea Bargain Agreements:
Prisoners Face Increased Sentences on Retrial
After Vacated Convictions
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution protects an
individual against deprivation of life, liberty or property by the federal
government without due process of law.' The protections provided by the
fifth amendment due process clause are substantively similar to the protec-
tions afforded an individual against state deprivation of life, liberty or
property under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 In the
122. See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text (analysis to support conclusion that
defendant has sixth amendment right and that vindication of right threatens no legitimate state
interest).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The phrase no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law," contained in the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution, refers to the law of the land as interpreted according to common law principles.
Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 323 (1892). The guarantee of due process of law dates back
to the inception of English civilized government. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123-124
(1876) (Magna Charta of 1215 contains due process of law provision). Due process of law
provides the primary and indispensible foundation of individual freedoms in the United States
Constitution. See In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1966) (due process defines both rights of
individual and limits on government power). Due process, however, is an elusive concept without
definable boundaries and exact definitions. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1959), reh'g
denied, 364 U.S. 855 (1960). Therefore, due process depends on elements that vary with the
specific facts and necessities of every situation. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84 (1909).
2. See Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 325 (1903) (courts construe due process of law in
fourteenth amendment in same sense and scope as due process in fifth amendment); Hallinger
-v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 323 (1892) (due process of law in fourteenth amendment carries same
meaning and scope as due process in fifth amendment); U.S. CONsT. amend. V (federal
government shall not deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
'law); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law); see also supra note I (discussing significance of constitutional right
to due process).
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context of criminal law, when an appellate court has overturned a conviction
based on a guilty plea, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to prohibit the
imposition of a more severe sentence on retrial for the same offense because
the possibility of receiving a harsher sentence might discourage defendants
from exercising their statutory right to appeal.3 The issue under consideration
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Whitley 4 concerned whether the imposition of an increased sentence
on retrial violated defendant Tommy Lee Whitley's constitutional right to
procedural due process.'
In Whitley, the defendant robbed a branch of the North Carolina
National Bank.6 During the robbery, the defendant seized a teller by the
neck and held a gun to the teller's head and body while carrying out the
crime. 7 Upon leaving the bank, Whitley released the teller and absconded.
8
A grand jury returned a four count indictment charging Whitley with
violating the Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113. 9 Specifically, the
3. See Wasman v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3217, 3223 (1984) (fifth amendment due
process clause bars increased sentence on retrial for same offense if increased penalty is result
of federal judicial vindictiveness against defendant exercising appellate right); North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724-25 (1969) (fourteenth amendment due process clause bars increased
sentence on retrial for same offense if increased penalty is result of state judicial vindictiveness
against defendant exercising appellate right). Compare infra note 50 (discussing Supreme Court's
decision in Wasman) with infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
decision in Pearce).
4. 759 F.2d 327 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 196 (1985).
5. Id. at 329.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. In United States v. Whitley, North Carolina state police, suspecting the defendant
Whitley of robbing a federal bank, arrested Whitley in Concord, North Carolina the week
following the bank robbery. Brief for Appellant at 7, United States v. Whitley, 759 F.2d 327
(4th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Brieffor Appellant]. Pursuant to the arrest, police conducted
a search of Whitley's automobile which revealed evidence linking him to the robbery. Id. The
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina upheld the police search of Whitley's
automobile and denied Whitley's motion to suppress the evidence thereby obtained. Id. In a panel
opinion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court. See Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329.
9. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329. The Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1982).
provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take,
from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other thing of
value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of,
any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association; or
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings and
loan association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit union, or
as a savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank, credit union,
or in such savings and loan association, or building, or part thereof, so used, any
felony affecting such bank, credit union, or such savings and loan association and in
violation of any statute of the United States, or any larceny-
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years,
or both.
19861
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
indictment charged that Whitley intended to rob a bank in violation of
section 2113(a), carried away money valued at greater than $100 in violation
of section 2113(b), committed armed robbery in violation of section 2113(d),
and kidnapped a teller in violation of section 2113(e). 10 As part of a plea
bargain agreement, Whitley pleaded guilty to armed robbery under subsection
(d) of 18 U.S.C. § 2113, which carries a statutory maximum penalty of
twenty-five years imprisonment." The prosecution, in turn, dismissed the
three remaining counts of the original indictment.' 2 After hearing the evi-
dence, the United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina imposed the maximum twenty-five year sentence under subsection
(d), which the court later reduced to twenty years. 3
Subsequently, Whitley moved to vacate the sentence pursuant to 28
(b) Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or
money or any other thing of value exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the care,
custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any
savings and loan association, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both; or
Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or
money or any other thing of value not exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the care,
custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any
savings and loan association, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both...
(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in
subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the
life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
(e) Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section, or in avoiding or
attempting to avoid apprehension for the commission of such offense, or in freeing
himself or attempting to free himself from arrest or confinement for such offense,
kills any person, or forces any person to accompany him without the consent of such
person, shall be imprisoned not less than ten years, or punished by death if the
verdict of the jury shall so direct.
Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 1721, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 637 (1937) (discussing legislative history of
Federal Bank Robbery Act). Congress enacted the Federal Bank Robbery Act to prohibit the
stealing of money from a federally insured bank; therefore, the act proscribes a different type
of crime than common law robbery. H.R. REP. No. 1721. The Act has withstood constitutional
challenges on several grounds. See United States v. Bolin, 423 F.2d 834, 837-38 (9th Cir.) (§
2113(b) is not unconstitutional even though § 2113(b) permits different penalties for similar
offenses), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 954 (1970); Clark v. United States, 184 F.2d 952, 954 (10th
Cir. 1950) (Federal Bank Robbery Act does not violate tenth amendment proscription of federal
interference with state police power), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 955 (1951); Audett v. United States,
132 F.2d 528, 529 (8th Cir. 1942) (Federal Bank Robbery Act is not unconstitutionally vague
or indefinite).
10. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329; see supra note 9 (text of 18 U.S.C. § 2113).
11. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329; see supra note 9 (text of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d)).
12. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329. In Whitley, a grand jury indicted the defendant on
subsections (a), (b), (d) and (e) of 18 U.S.C. § 2113. Id.; see supra note 9 (text of 18 U.S.C. §
2113(d)). Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, the defendant pleaded guilty to subsection (d)
and the prosecution dismissed subsections (a), (b) and (e). Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329.
13. See Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329 (district court in Whitley did not issue written opinion).
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U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. 4 Although the
district court denied Whitley's motion to vacate, on appeal the Fourth Circuit
reversed and remanded the case to the district court to set aside Whitley's
conviction.' In setting aside Whitley's conviction, the Fourth Circuit found
that Whitley's counsel was ineffective because defense counsel had advised
Whitley to plead guilty under subsection (d) of section 2113 to avoid
imposition of the death penalty provision of subsection (e).' 6 The Fourth
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court effectively had abolished the death
penalty provision of section 2113 sixteen years before Whitley's plea bar-
gain.' 7 Upon retrial under the original indictment, a jury found Whitley
guilty on each of the four counts of the indictment, sections 2113(a), (b),
14. Id. Section 2255 of title 28 of the United States Code provides in relevant part that a
prisoner in the custody of a court may attack collaterally his conviction by filing a motion with
the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, to set aside or to correct the sentence. Id.; see
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982) (scope of defendants' postconviction remedies in district courts).
Congress enacted § 2255 to shift the burden of post conviction judicial review away from courts
in the district of incarceration, which are the appropriate courts for habeas corpus claims, to
the court that originally meted out the sentence. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427-28
(1962). The Supreme Court in Hill noted that federal prisoners have available the same remedies
under § 2255 as are available under a habeas corpus petition. Id. A federal prisoner also may
make the same constitutional appeals under § 2255 that a state prisoner may raise on a habeas
corpus petition. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 479-80 (1976) (expressing view that all
constitutional guarantees demand similar treatment with extensive relief for violations of those
guarantees); see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-415 (1963) (habeas corpus procedure is proper
for all constitutional challenges). See generally Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447-50 (1953)
(discussing procedural constraints on habeas corpus claim).
In Whitley, the defendant filed a motion to vacate under § 2255 based on ineffective
assistance of counsel. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329. Several courts have held that a motion to
vacate a conviction under § 2255 is the proper procedure to attack the conviction on the grounds
of ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Harshaw v. United States, 542 F.2d 455, 457 (8th
Cir. 1979) (stating standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims under § 2255 requires
trial record to support defendant's allegations of prejudicial harm); United States v. Valenciano,
495 F.2d 585, 587-88 (3d Cir. 1974) (finding § 2255 motion is proper means to assert that
assistance of counsel was ineffective in guilty plea negotiations); United States v. Fisher, 477
F.2d 300, 302 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding § 2255 motion is proper procedure to attack conviction
based on ineffective assistance of counsel). Circumstances sufficient to attack successfully a
guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel include counsel using erroneous interpre-
tations of the law to advise a defendant, and counsel imploring a defendant to accept a guilty
plea. See Cook v. United States, 461 F.2d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1972) (ineffective assistance of
counsel found when counsel erroneously advised defendant to plead guilty on forgery charge to
avoid possible sentence six times greater than actually permitted by law); Edgerton v. State, 315
F.2d 676, 677 (4th Cir. 1963) (ineffective assistance of counsel found when counsel repeatedly
urged defendant to plead guilty to burglary and rape).
15. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329.
16. Brief for Appellant, supra note 8, at 3.
17. United States v. Whitley, 734 F.2d 994, 995 n.l (4th Cir. 1984) (panel opinion); see
Pope v. United States, 392 U.S. 651, 651 (1968) (per curiam) (finding death penalty provision
in § 2113(e) suffered from same constitutional infirmity found in Federal Kidnapping Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1201(a)); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 572-91 (1968) (abolishing § 1201
dealth penalty provision of Federal Kidnapping Act as violative of fifth and sixth amendments
to constitution).
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(d) and (e). 8 The conviction carried a statutory maximum penalty of life
imprisonment under subsection (e) of section 2113, the kidnapping offense.'9
The district court merged the four counts and sentenced Whitley to fifty
years imprisonment under subsection (e) of section 2113.20 The Fourth
Circuit, in a panel opinion, vacated the fifty year sentence, reasoning that
an increased sentence upon retrial for the same offense violated Whitley's
due process rights. 2' Subsequently, however, the Fourth Circuit granted
reconsideration en banc and affirmed the fifty year sentence. 2
In affirming Whitley's fifty year sentence, the Fourth Circuit en banc,
stated that the threshold issue concerned whether 18 U.S.C. § 2113 creates
greater and lesser included offenses, or simply one offense with increased
penalty provisions for aggravating circumstances. 23 The Fourth Circuit ex-
plained that if section 2113 creates only one offense, then due process
considerations would bar any increased sentence on retrial for the same
offense, unless the second trial court included in the record objective
information concerning the defendant's conduct between trials that would
justify an increased sentence. 24 Because the district court that retried Whitley
had not included the necessary information, the court could not increase
Whitley's sentence without violating Whitley's due process rights. 25 In con-
trast, however, the Fourth Circuit stated that if section 2113 creates greater
and lesser included offenses, due process would not bar imposition of an
increased sentence on retrial because a conviction under subsection (d) of
section 2113 would be for a different crime than a conviction under subsec-
tion (e) of section 2113.26 Subsection (d) of section 2113 proscribes the crime
18. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329; see supra note 9 (text of 18 U.S.C. § 2113).
19. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329 n.1; see Pope v. United States, 392 U.S. 651, 651 (1968),
(per curiam); supra note 17 (Pope effectively abolished death penalty provision of subsection
(e)).
20. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329. In sentencing the defendant to 50 years under subsection
(e) of § 2113, the sentencing judge in Whitley commented that Whitley's crime represented one
of the worst the judge had seen while on the district court bench. Id. at 331. The judge added
that Whitley's actions displayed a willful disregard for human life and constituted completely
inexcusable conduct. See id. at 331-32. The sentencing judge stated that the sentence should be
commensurate with the crime and imposed a 50 year sentence. Id. at 322.
21. Whitley, 734 F.2d 994, 997-98 (4th Cir. 1984) (panel opinion).
22. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 330; see infra text accompanying note 45 (stating Supreme Court's prophylactic
rule in North Carolina v. Pearce that bars increased sentence on retrial for same offense unless
justified by objective facts in trial record); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1968).
25. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 330.
26. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Whitley carefully explained that a retrial on a greater
included offense, unlike a retrial on the same offense, does not trigger the proscriptions of the
doctrine enunciated in North Carolina v. Pearce. Id. at 332; see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 726 (1968); infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
decision in Pearce); United States v. Barker, 581 F.2d 589, 590-93 (9th Cir. 1982); infra notes
60-66 (discussing Ninth Circuit's decision in Barker in which Ninth Circuit found that increased
sentences on retrial for greater included offense does not offend defendant's due process rights);
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of armed robbery, while subsection (e) proscribes the crime of kidnapping
during the commission of an armed robbery.27 After examining the legislative
history and the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113, the Fourth Circuit concluded that section 2113 creates greater and
lesser included offenses. 2 Therefore, the benefit of Whitley's plea bargain
agreement dissolved when the Fourth Circuit vacated the plea bargain in
which Whitley pleaded guilty to violating subsection (d) of section 2113.29
The Whitley court stated that, on retrial, the jury convicted Whitley of
kidnapping, a more serious offense than the armed robbery offense to which
Whitley originally had pleaded guilty and received a twenty year sentence.
30
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit held that the increased sentence Whitley
received on retrial did not violate due process of law.3
Although both dissenting judges in Whitley agreed with the Fourth
Circuit's holding that section 2113 creates greater and lesser included offen-
ses, the dissenting judges argued that the Fourth Circuit should reverse the
fifty year sentence imposed in the defendant's retrial on other grounds.
3 2
Judge Winter, in dissent, argued that Whitley's fifty year sentence should be
vacated because the original sentencing court was aware of all the criminal
acts Whitley committed when the court sentenced Whitley based on his plea
of guilty.3 The district court was aware of the armed robbery and the
kidnapping because both acts occurred in the single criminal transaction of
robbing the bank.3" Since the district court, with full knowledge of all of
United States ex rel v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
914 (1971); infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's decision in McMann
in which Second Circuit found that increased sentences on retrial for greater included offense
do not offend defendant's due process rights under Pearce rule).
27. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329 n.l; see supra note 9 (text of 18 U.S.C. § 2113); infra text
accompanying notes 100-02 (discussing lesser included offenses under § 2113).
28. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 331.
29. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 66 (vacated guilty plea dissolves plea bargain
agreement).
30. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329. In Whitley, after the Fourth Circuit vacated the defendant's
plea of guilty to § 2113(d), the prosecution tried the defendant on the original indictment and
the district court jury convicted the defendant on all counts of the indictment, subsections (a),
(b), (d) and (e) of 18 U.S.C. § 2113. Id.; see supra note 9 (text of 18 U.S.C. § 2113); infra
note 65 and accompanying text (vacated guilty plea constrains prosecutor to proceed under
original indictment). The district court judge merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant
to 50 years imprisonment. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329; see Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322,
327-29 (1957) (holding only one sentence possible for multiple convictions under § 2113).
31. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329.
32. Id. at 333 (Winter, J., dissenting); Id. at 336 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 333 (Winter, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 333-34 (Winter, J., dissenting); see Whitley, 734 F.2d at 997-98 (panel opinion)
(single criminal transaction distinguished from multiple criminal transactions). In the Fourth
Circuit panel opinion in United States v. Whitley, Judge Winter explained that a single criminal
transaction involves only one physical act perpetrated by the defendant on a single occasion.
See Whitley, 734 F.2d at 998. Furthermore, all charges under the indictment for a single
criminal transaction relate to that single criminal act. See id. In contrast to a single criminal
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Whitley's criminal acts, did not mete out the maximum sentence under the
plea bargain conviction, Judge Winter contended that due process of law
barred any increased sentence on retrial.3 5 In a separate dissent in which
three judges concurred, Judge Murnaghan argued that at the time Whitley
filed his motion to vacate the original conviction and sentence, Whitley relied
on Fourth Circuit authority which clearly held that section 2113 created
merely one offense with increased penalties for aggravating circumstances.
3 6
Judge Murnaghan, therefore, contended that when the Whitley court held
that section 2113 creates greater and lesser included offenses, the Fourth
Circuit violated Whitley's due process rights by creating a new interpretation
of an existing statute and trapping Whitley in a changing labyrinth of the
law.
37
The Fourth Circuit in Whitley correctly determined that the defendant's
increased sentence on retrial did not violate due process of law. 38 In making
the determination, the Fourth Circuit properly relied on the leading Supreme
Court case on the issue, North Carolina v. Pearce.3 9 In Pearce, the United
States Supreme Court consolidated two cases with similar fact patterns.4 0 In
both cases, the defendants successfully appealed convictions and received
transaction, Judge Winter suggested that a multiple criminal transaction involves many physical
acts perpetrated by the defendant on different occasions. See id. Moreover, the charges contained
in the indictment for multiple criminal transactions may require separate trials. See id.
35. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 333 (Winter, J., dissenting); see infra notes 104-06 and accom-
panying text (discussing Judge Winter's analysis in Whitley dissent).
36. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 335-36 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
37. Id.; see infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Murnaghan's
analysis in Whitley dissent).
38. See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text (due process of law does not prohibit
increased sentence on retrial for greater included offense); infra notes 77-101 and accompanying
text (supporting Whitley holding that court retried defendant on greater included offense).
39. 395 U.S. 711 (1968).
40. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 713 (1968). The Supreme Court in Pearce,
consolidated for decision two cases, North Carolina v. Pearce and Simpson v. Rice. Id. at 713-
14. In Pearce, the defendant was charged and convicted of assaulting a woman with intent to
commit rape. Id. at 713. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a prison term of 12-15
years. Id. Several years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court set aside the conviction in a
state post conviction proceeding because the court found trial court error in admitting an
involuntary confession against the defendant. Id. On retrial, a jury again convicted Pearce and
the state court sentenced the defendant to eight years imprisonment, a longer sentence than
imposed by the original trial court when considered in conjunction with the time the defendant
already had spent in prison. Id. In Simpson, the defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree
burglary and received a 10 year prison sentence. Id. at 714. Subsequently, pursuant to a state
coram nobis proceeding in which the defendant alleged a violation of his sixth amendment right
to counsel, a state court convicted the defendant on the same charge and sentenced the prisoner
to 25 years imprisonment. Id. The writ of coram nobis, literally "our court," is a proceeding
to obtain relief from errors of fact made at trial through duress, fraud or excusable mistake,
without negligence on the defendant's part. People v. Adamson, 34 Cal.2d 320,-., 210 P.2d
13, 15-16 (1949); see People v. Crawford, 1 Cal. Rptr. 811, 812 (1959) (coram nobis is limited
remedy available only when no other remedy exists); State v. Kubus, 243 Minn. 379 -, 68 N.W.2d
217, 218 (1955) (coram nobis is common law writ that must be filed in same court that rendered
erroneous judgment). Although rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished the
use of the writ of coram nobis in federal courts, the writ retains its vitality in criminal proceedings.
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new trials. 41 Upon retrial, the respective courts found both defendants guilty
and imposed sentences more severe than the sentences that the courts
originally had imposed. 42 In reviewing the defendants' claims that the in-
creased sentences imposed on retrial violated the defendants' due process
rights, the Supreme Court in Pearce stated that punishing prisoners for
exercising their constitutional rights on appeal by increasing the prisoners'
sentences if found guilty on retrial would have a chilling effect upon the
entire legal system.' 3 Consequently, the Pearce opinion established a prohpylac-
tic rule to safeguard individuals from both actual vindictiveness and the ap-
prehension of vindictiveness for asserting their constitutional rights on ap-
peal.4 4 To guarantee that vindictiveness plays no role in the resentencing of
a defendant found guilty on retrial, Pearce mandates that a trial judge enter
into the record objective facts gleaned from the defendant's demeanor be-
tween the two trials that justify the increased sentence.' 5
See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506-10 (1954) (courts may employ writ of coram
nobis within scope of common law usage in criminal cases); FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (procedure
for obtaining relief from civil judgment must be by 60(b) motion or independent action).
41. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 713-14.
42. Id.; see supra note 40 (discussing Pearce and Simpson).
43. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724. In Pearce, the Supreme Court held that the immunity from
harsher punishment accorded defendants exercising their constitutional rights applies equally to
retrials granted for nonconstitutional error and retrials granted for constitutional error. Id. The
Supreme Court in Pearce stated that the mere inherent threat of penalizing prisoners for exercis-
ing their constitutional right to challenge a conviction based on constitutional error would have
a chilling effect on the guarantees provided by the Constitution. Id. The Pearce opinion further
stated that the same chilling effect results when a court penalizes prisoners for appealing convic-
tions based on nonconstitutional error because the detrimental effect on the right to appeal is
no less flagrant. Id.
44. Id. at 725. In attempting to allay prisoners' fears of judicial vindictiveness that might
deter a defendant from exercising the constitutional right to appeal, the Supreme Court in Pearce
stated that a prophylactic rule would most effectively protect prisoners against vindictiveness.
Id. The Pearce opinion cited the case of Patton v. North Carolina as indicative of prisoners'
fears that exercising appellate rights would result in increased sentences on retrial. Id. at n.20;
see Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225, 231 n.7 (W.D.N.C. 1966), aff'd, 381 F.2d 636
(1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968). In Patton, the defendant, who had already served 34
months of a 20 to 30 years sentence for committing an abominable and detestable crime against
human nature (sodomy), wrote a letter to the trial judge explaining that he, the defendant, awaited
a new trial. Patton, 256 F. Supp. at 231 n.7. In his letter, the defendant said "I know it is usuelly
the courts prosedure to give a larger sentence when a new trile is granted I guess this is to discourage
Petitioners [sic]." Id. See generally Note, Constitutional Law: Increased Sentence and Denial
of Credit on Retrial Sustained Under Traditional Waiver Theory, Durm L.J. 395, 398-403 (1965)
(judicial retaliation against prisoners exercising constitutional right to appeal may be a significant
problem in retrial sentencing).
45. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726. To prevent judicial vindictiveness from deterring a defendant
from exercising the right to appeal, the Supreme Court in Pearce concluded that a court may
not impose an increased sentence on retrial unless the court articulates objective facts justifying
the increased sentence that are fully reviewable for constitutional legitimacy on appeal. Id. In
Wasman v. United States, however, the Supreme Court weakened the Pearce prophylactic rule
by allowing resentencing judges to consider relevant events occurring subsequent to the original
trial as well as the defendant's conduct. Wasman v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3217, 3225 (1984);
see infra note 50 (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Wasman).
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The Supreme Court recently has elaborated on the Pearce holding by
stating that appellate courts faced with a due process argument arising out
of an increased sentence on retrial for the same offense must follow a two
step analysis.4 6 First, a court must determine whether actual vindictiveness
motivated a trial judge to impose an increased sentence. 47 If an appellate
court finds actual vindictiveness, then due process of law bars any increased
punishment on retrial. 48 If a reviewing court, however, finds that actual
vindictiveness did not motivate a trial judge to impose an increased sentence,
an appellate court still must determine whether a trial judge has allayed a
prisoner's apprehension that the harsher penalty is not a product of vindic-
tiveness for exercising a successful appeal. 49 The Supreme Court has stated
that the Pearce prophylactic rule thus creates a presumption of vindictiveness
that the sentencing judge must rebut by objective information entered into
the record. 0 The Pearce prophylactic rule, however, often is a harsh obstacle
to a conscientious effort to deal with crime.-" As a result, the Supreme Court
46. See Wasman v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3217, 3221 (1984) (explaining Pearce due
process prohibitions against judicial vindictiveness); infra note 50 (discussing Supreme Court's
decision in Wasman).
47. See Wasman, 104 S. Ct. at 3221; Whitley, 759 F.2d at 330 (appellate court first
determines whether actual vindictiveness motivated trial court to impose increased sentence on
retrial).
48. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.
49. See Wasman, 104 S. Ct. at 3221; Whitley, 759 F.2d at 330 (appellate court must
ensure that record justifies increased sentence on retrial to satisfy due process prohibitions
against judicial vindictiveness).
50. See Wasman, 104 S. Ct. at 3221 (explaining Pearce rebuttable presumption of judicial
vindictiveness). In Wasman v. United States, the trial court had sentenced the defendant to two
years imprisonment, partially suspended, under a conviction for knowingly and willfully making
false statements in a passport application. Id. at 3219. The Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction,
finding error in the trial court's decision to exclude crucial evidence needed by Wasman to
provide a valid defense. See United States v. Wasman, 641 F.2d 326, 329 (1981) (finding
reversible error in refusing to admit defendant's evidence alleging legally-changed name).
Subsequently, but before retrial on the passport fraud charge, another trial court entered a
judgment against Wasman for possessing counterfeit certificates of deposit. Wasman, 104 S.
Ct. at 3219. Upon retrial in the original district court for passport fraud, a jury convicted
Wasman as charged. Id. at 3220. The resentencing judge took into consideration the intervening
counterfeit certificates conviction and sentenced Wasman to two years' imprisonment without
any suspension. Id. In affirming the imposition of the increased sentence, the Supreme Court
in Wasman stated that the district court effectively rebutted the Pearce presumption of
vindictiveness by articulating that an intervening event, the counterfeit conviction, occurred
between the two trials thereby justifying the increased sentence. Id. The Supreme Court in
Wasman stated that the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness applies only when, on retrial for
the same offense or a different offense not charged in the original indictment, harsher penalties
result from judicial or prosecutorial vindictiveness against a defendant for appealing his
convictions. Id. at 3223. The Supreme Court also stated that when the Pearce presumption of
vindictiveness does not apply because the threat of judical retaliation is remote, such as a retrial
on a greater included offense, the defendant must prove conclusively that any increased sentence
on retrial is the product of actual judical vindictiveness. Id.; see supra note 45 and accompanying
text (Pearce prophylactic rule prohibiting judicial vindictiveness).
51. Wasman, 104 S. Ct. at 3222.
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has been adamant in refusing to expand the Pearce prophylactic rule beyond
the situation in which a prisoner receives an increased sentence on retrial for
the same offense.
2
In applying the Supreme Court's two step analysis for detecting judicial
vindictiveness, the Fourth Circuit in Whitley correctly determined that actual
vindictiveness did not motivate the district court in sentencing Whitley to an
increased sentence." The Fourth Circuit noted that the district court entered
into the trial record resentencing comments making clear that actual vindic-
tiveness did not motivate the increased penalty meted out.5 4 Then, in deter-
mining whether the Pearce prophylactic rule applied to invalidate Whitley's
increased sentence, the Fourth Circuit correctly framed the issue in Whitley
as being whether section 2113 creates merely one offense or whether section
2113 creates greater and lesser included offenses.5 If section 2113 creates
merely one offense, Pearce would bar imposition of Whitley's sentence on
retrial because the district court failed to articulate objective facts concerning
Whitley's conduct to merit an increased sentence in accordance with the
Pearce prophylactic rule.16 If section 2113 creates greater and lesser included
offenses, however, Pearce would not bar imposition of an increased sentence
on retrial because no presumption of vindictiveness exists when a court retries
and convicts a defendant on a greater included offense.
57
In support of the Fourth Circuit's assertion that the prophylactic rule of
52. Id. In finding that the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness exacts a heavy toll upon
effective law enforcement, the Supreme Court in Wasman stated that the Court has been
hesitant to expand the presumption beyond the situation when a judge metes out an increased
sentence on retrial for the same offense, or an offense not charged in the original indictment.
Id; see, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 384 (1982) (refusing to apply presumption
of vindictiveness when prosecution added felony charge to misdemeanor charge subsequent to
defendant's demand for jury trial); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1978) (finding
prosecutor's threat of charging greater offense if defendant refuses plea bargain as constitutional
negotiation permissible in plea bargaining); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 26-27 (1973)
(refusing to apply presumption of vindictiveness to increased sentence imposed by second jury
upon retrial because threat of vindictiveness is minimal); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 119
(1972) (finding state two-tier trial procedure not inherently vindictive). But see Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974) (applying rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness when prosecutor
substituted felony charge for vacated misdemeanor charge on trial de novo).
53. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 330 n.5; see infra note 54 (review of district court's resentencing
comments indicated no actual vindictiveness).
54. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 330 n.5. In determining that actual vindictiveness did not
motivate the district court judge who sentenced Whitley after the jury had found Whitley guilty
on retrial, the Fourth Circuit in Whitley relied on the resentencing judge's comments. Id.
In Whitley, before imposing the fifty year sentence, the resentencing judge stated that any sentence
meted out would not be to penalize Whitley for exercising his constitutional right to appeal. Id.
Moreover, the judge specifically entered into the record that vindictiveness did not motivate
him in resentencing Whitley. Id.
55. Id. at 329.
56. Id.; see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (due process prohibits increased
sentence if 18 U.S.C. § 2113 creates merely one offense with aggravating circumstances).
57. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329; see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (due process
does not bar increased sentence if 18 U.S.C. § 2113 creates greater and lesser included offenses).
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Pearce does not operate to bar an increased sentence on retrial for a greater
included offense are the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Barker,5"
and the Second Circuit's decision in United States ex rel. v. McMann.59 In
Barker, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
due process did not preclude an increased sentence for conviction on a greater
included offense after the court had vacated a conviction under a lesser
included offense. 60 A grand jury in Barker returned an indictment charging
the defendant with first degree murder. 6t Subsequently, the defendant pleaded
guilty to the lesser included offense of second degree murder. 62 The defendant
in Barker argued that accepting the guilty plea on the lesser included offense,
second degree murder, implied acquittal on the greater included offense, first
degree murder. 63 The Ninth Circuit in Barker, however, refused to accept
the defendant's argument on the basis that reinstatement of the indictment
would pose no threat to Barker's fifth amendment due process or double
jeopardy rights. 64 The court reasoned that when a defendant's plea bargain
58. 681 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1982).
59. 436 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971).
60. United States v. Barker, 681 F.2d 589, 592-93 (9th Cir. 1982).
61. Id. at 590.
62. Id.
63. Brief for Appellee at 5, United States v. Barker, 681 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1982).
64. Barker, 681 F.2d at 592-93. In holding that the prosecutor's non-retaliatory reinstate-
ment of the original indictment on retrial did not offend the defendant's fifth amendment due
process rights, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Barker, relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Goodwin. Id. at 593; see United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368,
373 (1982) (holding North Carolina v. Pearce proscribes only vindictively motivated prosecutorial
and judicial conduct); supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
decision in Pearce). Additionally, the Barker court held that the prosectuor's use of the original
indictment on retrial did not violate the defendant's fifth amendment protection against double
jeopardy. See Ward v. Page, 424 F.2d 491, 493 (10th Cir.) (reinstatement of original indictment
does not offend fifth amendment double jeopardy clause), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 917 (1970),
reh'g denied, 400 U.S. 1002 (1971); see also U.S. CoNsT. amend V (no person shall be subject
to double jeopardy of life and limb). In Ward v. Page, a grand jury returned an indictment
charging the defendant, Ward, with first degree murder. Ward, 424 F.2d at 492. Ward pleaded
guilty to the lessesr included offense of manslaughter. Id. In a subsequent evidentiary hearing,
the Tenth Circuit found that Ward initially pleaded guilty to the manslaughter charge involu-
tarily. Id. The prosecution in Ward, faced with an order from the Tenth Circuit to act or
appeal, retried the defendant under the original incidtment. Id. On retrial, a jury convicted
Ward of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment.
Id. Ward then appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals which reduced the
defendant's sentence to 40 years with credit for time already served. Id. Ward then petitioned
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma for habeas corpus relief,
alleging that the double jeopardy clause precluded Ward's retrial on the murder charge. Id. at
493. On appeal from the district court's denial of Ward's habeas corpus writ, the Tenth Circuit
rejected the defendant's claim that a guilty plea on a lesser offense of manslaughter implies ac-
quittal on the greater offense of murder. Id. The Tenth Circuit held that when voluntarily at-
tacked by a defendant, a guilty plea on a lesser included offense does not serve to abrogate all
greater offenses contained within the indictment because no trier of fact adjudicated the elements
of the greater included offenses at the plea bargain hearing. Id. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the prosecutor in Ward did not violate the defendant's rights under the fifth amend-
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agreement terminates, a prosecutor may proceed only by charging the defen-
dant under the original indictment. 6-5 When a judge vacates a plea bargain
agreement, therefore, the benefit of the bargain dissolves and upon retrial
for a greater or separate offense, the sentencing court may consider the elements
of all the crimes charged in the original indictment.
6 6
Based on reasoning similar to the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in
Barker, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
McMann held that Pearce did not apply to limit a sentence imposed for
conviction on a greater included offense after the court had vacated a
conviction under a lesser included offense. 67 In McMann, a grand jury
returned an indictment charging the defendant with feloniously selling a
narcotic drug.6 Subsequently, the defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser
included offense of attempted felonious sale of a narcotic drug. 69 After
successfully petitioning the Second Circuit to set aside the guilty plea
conviction, the defendant faced retrial on the original indictment and received
an increased sentence.7 0 In affirming the increased penalty, the McMann
court, like the Barker court, reasoned that due process does not prevent an
increased sentence on retrial for a greater included offense.7 ' The Second
Circuit stated that because the defendant unilaterally revoked his part of the
ment double jeopardy clause by retrying Ward on a greater included offense contained in the
original indictment. Id. See generally Note, "Upping the Ante" Against the Defendant Who
Successfully Attacks his Guilty Plea: Double Jeopardy and Due Process Implications, 50 NOTRE
D mE LAW., 857, 878 (1975) (double jeopardy and due process are insufficient grounds to attack
increased sentence on retrial after appellate court vacates original plea bargain conviction).
65. Barker, 681 F.2d at 593. In determining that a prosecutor must charge a defendant
under the original indictment on retrial, the Ninth Circuit in Barker reasoned that imposing
charges under the original indictment places the prosecution and the defense on neutral legal
footing. Id. at 593. The Barker court further held that absent a retaliatory intent by a prosecutor
to punish a prisoner for appealing a conviction, charging a prisoner under the original indictment
does not offend due process of law. Id. The Barker court concluded that a prosecutor, without
violating due process considerations, may enhance the charges against a defendant if the
defendant refuses to plead guilty to a plea bargain agreement. Id.; see supra note 52 (limiting
due process proscriptions of Pearce to situation of increased sentence on retrial for same offense
or offense not charged in original indictment); Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726 (due process proscriptions
against increased sentences on retrial for same offense).
66. Barker, 681 F.2d at 593.
67. United States ex rel. v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 914 (1971).
68. Id. at 104.
69. Id.
70. Id. In United States ex rel. v. McMann, the defendant's plea bargain agreement on
the attempted felonious sale charge permitted a maximum sentence of three to seven years
imprisonment. Id. The defendant, pursuant to the erroneous belief that the court would sentence
him as a second felony offender under the plea bargain charge, sought permission to withdraw
his plea. Id. Subsequent to accepting the withdrawal of the defendant's plea, the trial court in
McMann convicted the defendant of feloniously selling narcotics under the original indictment.
Id. The trial court in McMann then sentenced the defendant to a term of five to ten years
imprisonment. Id.
71. See id. at 107; supra note 65 (due process rights of defendant not violated by charging
more severe offense on retrial under original indictment).
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plea bargain agreement, the prosecutor properly could revoke his acceptance
of the reduced charge and proceed on retrial under the charges contained in
the original indictment.12 In upholding the defendant's increased sentence on
retrial, the McMann court noted that when a defendant obtains the benefits
of a plea bargain agreement, yet remains at liberty to refute the plea bargain's
binding authority, the defendant receives a windfall by inducing the prose-
cutor to accept a reduced charge without the defendant accepting the
consequences. 73 The McMann court found that, for the defendant then to
attack the plea bargain conviction, while claiming that the plea bargain
sentence sets the upper limit on the defendant's jeopardy, the defendant
would disrupt the balance of justice between prosecution and defense. 74 The
McMann court concluded that an efficient plea bargain system is effective
only if both adversaries adhere to the confines of the agreement. 75 Otherwise,
prosecutors will abandon the plea bargain system, thus creating chaos in the
administration of criminal justice by increasing an already overburdened
Judicial system.
76
In determining whether section 2113 creates greater and lesser included
offenses, thus justifying Whitley's fifty year sentence on retrial under the
analyses of Barker and McMann, the Fourth Circuit in Whitley noted that
Congress has not used unambiguous language to indicate its intent in passing
section 2113. 77 The Supreme Court also has not issued a firm directive in
clarifying the proper interpretation of section 2113 .7 The Fourth Circuit,




76. Id. The Second Circuit in McMann cautioned that if courts allow defendants to attack
plea bargain agreements at will, then judges will become predisposed to allow withdrawals of
defendants' guilty pleas. Id. The McMann court concluded that disregarding judicial discretion
in determining whether to allow withdrawal of defendants' guilty pleas will impede judicial
efficiency and aggravate court congestion. Id. See The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HAiv.
L. REv. 30, 150 (1970) (suggesting breakdown of plea bargain system would severely impede
criminal justice).
77. See O'Clair v. United States, 470 F.2d 1199, 1202 (lst Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 921 (1973). The First Circuit in O'Clair v. United States noted that the ambiguous wording
of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 obscures the purpose that Congress had in passing the statute. Id.; see
supra note 9 (text of 18 U.S.C. § 2113). A House of Representatives Report concerning the
congressional purpose in passing § 2113 illustrates the ambiguity of § 2113. O'Clair, 470 F.2d
at 1202; see H.R. REP. No. 1461, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). In relevant part, the House
Report states that if during a bank robbery the perpetrator puts the life of any person in
jeopardy by using a dangerous weapon, the statute increases the sentence to a fine not less than
$1000 nor greater than $10,000, or imprisonment of not greater than 25 years or both. H.R.
REP. No. 1461. The problem of interpreting the House report's sentencing passage lies in
whether the increased sentence for armed robbery implies that § 2113 creates one offense with
increasing penalty schemes, or rather, that § 2113 creates greater and lesser included offenses
with corresponding penalty provisions. See O'Clair, 470 F.2d at 1202 (holding 18 U.S.C. § 2113
creates only one offense with aggravating circumstances despite ambiguous language in statute).
78. See United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544, 548 (1976) (distinguishing subsection (c)
of § 2113 from subsections (a), (b) and (d) without articulating issue in terminology of greater
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however, looked to the Supreme Court decisions in Prince v. United States 9
and United States v. Gaddis0 to construe the statute.8 ' Although neither
Prince nor Gaddis directly addressed the issue of whether section 2113 creates
greater and lesser included offenses or a single offense with aggravating
penalty schemes 8 2 the Fourth Circuit persuasively extrapolated from the
ambiguous language of the Supreme Court and applied the language in
Whitley to find that section 2113 creates greater and lesser included offenses."
In Prince, a federal grand jury returned a two count indictment charging
the defendant with unlawful entry into a bank with intent to perpetrate a
robbery under subsection (a) of section 2113, and armed robbery under
subsection (d). 4 In addressing the issue of whether the district court properly
convicted and sentenced the defendant under both counts of the indictment,
the Supreme Court in Prince stated that Congress intended section 2113 to
create lesser offenses. 5 The Prince opinion, however, is unclear concerning
what lesser offenses Congress intended to create. 6 Lesser offenses in Prince
merely may refer to the individual greater and lesser acts proscribed within
subsection (a) of section 2113, forcible robbery and entry with felonious
intent, and those acts proscribed in subsection (b), felonious larceny and
petit larceny." In contrast, lesser offenses in Prince may refer to the entire
set of acts proscribed by subsection (a), (b), and (d) of section 2113 as lesser
included offenses of subsection (e).88 The Supreme Court in Prince, however,
stated that Congress enacted subsection (a) of section 2113 in an effort to ensure
that one who entered a bank for the purpose of committing a crime, but
who failed in his attempt, would not escape justice.8 9 In addition, Congress
and lesser included offenses); United States v. Prince, 352 U.S. 322, 327 (1957) (invalidating
multiple sentences under subsections (a) and (b) of § 2113 without articulating issue in
terminology of greater and lesser included offenses); see also Note, The Federal Bank
Robbery Act-The Problem of Separately Punishable Offenses, 18 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 101,
110-27 (1976) (discussing language interpretation problems of § 2113) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Federal Bank Robbery Act]; Note, A General Sentence is to be Imposed for a Conviction
Consisting of Several Counts Charging Violation of the Federal Bank Robbery Act but the Term
Shall Not Exceed the Maximum Permissible Sentence on the Count that Carries the Maximum
Sentence, 9 Hous. L. REV. 579, 579-86 (1972) (discussing sentencing interpretation problems of
§ 2113).
79. 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
80. 424 U.S. 544 (1976).
81. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 331.
82. See supra note 78 (discussing Supreme Court's failure to resolve ambiguity of § 2113
language in Prince and Gaddis).
83. See Whitley, 759 F.2d at 331 (finding guidance from Prince and Gaddis that 18
U.S.C. § 2113 creates greater and lesser included offenses).
84. Prince, 352 U.S. at 324.
85. Id. at 327.
86. See id. at 326-28; Note, Federal Bank Robbery Act, supra note 78, at 110 (discussing
interpretation problems of Prince opinion).
-87. See Prince, 352 U.S. at 326-28; supra note 9 (text of 18 U.S.C. § 2113).
88. See Prince, 352 U.S. at 326-28; supra note 9 (text of 18 U.S.C. § 2113).
89. Prince, 352 U.S. at 325-26. In United States v. Prince, the Supreme Court stated that
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segregated the lesser crimes of petit larceny and felonious larceny into subsection
(b). 91 Accordingly, a careful reading of the Prince opinion suggests that the
Supreme Court, like the Fourth Circuit, construed each entire subsection of
section 2113 as creating greater and lesser included offenses. 9'
Several years after the decision in Prince, the Supreme Court in Gaddis
faced another challenge to the proper relationship between the specific
subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 2113.92 In Gaddis, a federal grand jury returned
an eight count indictment charging two defendants with intent to rob a bank
in violation of subsection (a) of section 2113, possessing stolen bank funds
in violation of subsection (c), and armed robbery in violation of subsection
(d).93 The Supreme Court in Gaddis reasoned that Congress aimed the
subsection (c) crime of possessing money stolen from a bank at a separate
and distinct segment of criminals, uninvolved in the actual robbery of the
bank itself.94 Therefore, the Supreme Court's act of carving out subsection
(c) as an offense distinct from the offenses in other subsections of section
2113 suggests that the Gaddis opinion did not find that Congress intended
section 2113 to create merely one offense.95 Rather, the Supreme Court's
decision in Gaddis, like the decision in Prince, implies that Congress intended
section 2113 to create greater and lesser included offenses.96
In considering whether 18 U.S.C. § 2113 creates greater and lesser in-
cluded offenses, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals that have found
occasion to interpret section 2113 after Gaddis are split equally.9 7 Approxi-
Congress enacted the unlawful entry offense, subsection (a) of § 2113, in response to a request
from the Attorney General. Id. The Prince opinion revealed that the Attorney General argued
that without a provision in the Federal Bank Robbery Act proscribing the act of entering a
bank with felonious intent to rob, incongruous results in the law had developed. Id. In support
of his contention, the Attorney General cited a case in which a man secretly had stolen money
from a federal bank without using force or violence, the essential elements of the crime of
robbery. Id.; see Letter from Attorney General Homer S. Cummings to Hon. William B.
Bankhead, Speaker of the House of Representatives (March 17, 1937) (requesting changes in
Federal Bank Robbery Act). Although police apprehended the thief, The Act did not proscribe
the crime perpetrated by the thief and, therefore, the federal authorities could not prosecute
the perpetrator under The Act. Prince, 352 U.S. at 328.
90. Prince, 352 U.S. at 326 n.5.
91. See id. at 327-28.
92. Gaddis, 424 U.S. at 547-48.
93. Id. at 545-46.
94. Id. at 547-48. In United States v. Gaddis, the Supreme Court affirmed Heflin v.
United States, in which the Supreme Court held that Congress, by enacting subsection (c) of §
2113, attempted to reach a class of criminals distinct from the perpetrators of the actual
robbery. Id.; see Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 420 (1958). The Supreme Court in
Gaddis concluded that subsection (c) cannot merge with the other subsections of § 2113 because
Congress aimed the crime at a different group of wrongdoers. Gaddis, 424 U.S. at 548.
95. See Gaddis, 424 U.S. at 547-48.
96. See id.; supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (suggesting Supreme Court in Prince
interpreted § 2113 as creating greater and lesser included offenses).
97. See infra note 98 (indicating circuit courts of appeals are split on proper interpretation
of § 2113).
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mately half of the circuits have held that section 2113 creates greater and lesser
included offenses, while the remaining circuits have held that section 2113
creates merely one offense. 9' The very definition of a lesser included offense,
however, bolsters the Fourth Circuit's finding that section 2113 creates
greater and lesser included offenses. 99 A lesser included offense is an offense
that contains common elements, but fewer in number than a greater offense
such that a perpetrator cannot commit the greater offense without also
committing the lesser offense.' 0 Under section 2113, therefore, a jury
cannot convict a defendant for armed robbery under subsection (d) unless
the defendant also commits all elements of the offense of forcible robbery
under subsection (a).1'0 Similarly, a jury cannot convict a defendant for
kidnapping under subsection (e) unless the defendant also has committed all
elements of the offense of armed robbery under subsection (d).'" 2 Thus, the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Congressional intent in Prince and Gaddis,
the precedent of half of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the
definition of lesser included offenses, all support the Fourth Circuit's holding
that section 2113 creates greater and lesser included offenses. 03
Although agreeing with the Fourth Circuit that section 2113 creates
greater and lesser included offenses rather than a single offense with aggra-
vating circumstances, Judge Winter argued in dissent that due process should
bar Whitley's increased sentence.' 4 Because Whitley involved a single crim-
inal transaction in which the district court judge accepted the guilty plea and
imposed sentence with full knowledge of all facts of the crime, Judge Winter
asserted that Pearce prohibited increased punishment on retrial.'0 5 Judge
98. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 665 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir. 1981) (per curiam)
(subsection (a) of § 2113 is lesser included offense of subsection (d)); United States v. Fultz, 602
F.2d 830, 832 n.6 (8th Cir. 1979) (subsection (a) of § 2113 is lesser included offense of subsection
(d)); United States v. Fleming, 594 F.2d 598, 609 (7th Cir.) (subsection (e) of § 2113 creates a
separate offense within statutory scheme permitting separately imposed sentences), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 831 (1979); United States v. Davis, 573 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir.) (subsection (a)
and (d) are lesser and greater included offenses under § 2113), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978).
But see, e.g., United States v. Bosque, 691 F.2d 866, 868 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982) (subsection (d) is
not separate offense under § 2113 but enhances possible penalties of subsections (a) and (b)
when additional circumstances are present); United States v. Herrold, 635 F.2d 213, 215 (3d
Cir. 1980) (subsection (d) of § 2113 merely makes offense of simple bank robbery an aggravated
robbery with increased penalty); United States v. Rossi, 552 F.2d 381, 383 (Ist Cir. 1977) (§
2113 creates one offense with punishments varying by subsections).
99. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 331.
100. 2 WHARTON'S CRMINAL PROCEDURE 339-40 (C. Torcia 12th ed. 1975) (defining lesser
included offenses).
101. See supra note 9 (text of 18 U.S.C. § 2113).
102. Id.
103. See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's decisions
in Prince and Gaddis); supra note 98 (circuit courts of appeals supporting position that § 2113
creates greater and lesser included offenses); supra text accompanying notes 100-02 (defining
lesser included offenses).
104. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 333-34 (Winter, J., dissenting).
105. Id. In dissent in Whitley, Judge Winter stated that when a defendant enters a guilty
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Winter contended that the Whitley single criminal transaction is in contrast
to other cases involving a plea bargain to only one of several criminal
transactions in which the district court judge may be unaware of all the facts
prior to sentencing.2 6 The Fourth Circuit, however, persuasively rebutted
Judge Winter's dissent by explaining that subsections (d) and (e) of section
2113 describe separate offenses with correspondingly separate penalty pro-
visions, as opposed to describing one offense with only one penalty provi-
sion.c 7 When the district court accepted Whitley's guilty plea under subsection
(d), the armed robbery subsection, the evidence presented at the sentencing
plea pursuant to committing a single criminal transaction, a trial court in accepting the plea
must hear all the evidence marshalled against the defendant. Id. Thus, if a court subse-
quently vacates a conviction, Judge Winter argued that on retrial under the original indictment,
the prosecution cannot produce any new evidence before the trier of fact. See id. Judge Winter,
in the Whitley dissent, contended that the Pearce doctrine applied to prohibit Whitley's 50 year
sentence because the original district court, in accepting Whitley's guilty plea of armed robbery
under subsection (d) of § 2113, heard all of the facts pertaining to the subsection (e) kidnapping
offense before sentencing Whitley to 20 years imprisonment. Id. Because the resentencing court
did not include any objective facts in the record justifying an increased sentence, Judge Winter
concluded that the 50 year sentence violated Whitley's right to due process of law. Id.; see
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726; note 45 and accompanying text (Pearce prophylactic
rule prohibiting judicial vindictiveness).
106. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 333 (Winter, J., dissenting); see supra note 34 (distinguishing
single from multiple criminal transactions). Judge Winter, in dissent in Whitley, relied on
Fourth Circuit precedent in United States v. Johnson to distinguish the special facts of Whitley
from the general rule that due process does not bar an increased sentence on retrial for a
different offense under the original indictment. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 334 (Winter, J., dissenting)
(en banc). (citing W hitley, 734 F.2d at 998) (panel opinion); see United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d
1170, 1174-75 (4th Cir. 1976) (due process does not bar increased sentence on retrial under
original indictment charging multiple criminal transactions). In Johnson, the defendant pleaded
guilty to counts one and four of the original indictment which charged the defendant with
conspiracy to distribute heroin and criminal enterprise, respectively. Johnson, 537 F.2d at 1171.
After vactaing the guilty plea conviction on count four only, the Fourth Circuit held that the
resentencing court would not violate Johnson's due process rights if the court meted out an
increased sentence when retrying Johnson on the three remaining counts of the original
indictment. Id. at 1172, 1174-75. Counts two and three of the indictment represented separate
transactions from the original plea bargain on counts one and four, yet the Fourth Circuit
made no mention of the single/multiple transactions significance. See id. at 1174-75. The
Johnson court mentioned North Carolina v. Pearce in a footnote, commenting that Pearce
would control the punishment that the resentencing court could mete out on retrial for conviction
under count four, the criminal enterprise charge. Id. at 1174 n.5; see North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 726 (1968); supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
decision in Pearce). The Johnson court also stated, however, that retrial on the original
indictment places both prosecution and defense on the same footing. Johnson, 537 F.2d at
1175. A conviction on counts two and three of the indictment would expose Johnson to the
real threat of being resentenced to a longer term since new evidence, inadmissible under the
plea bargain, would be admissible on a retrial under the original indictment. Id. Consequently,
Johnson actually supports the Fourth Circuit's decision in Whitley because the trial court that
accepted Whitley's plea bargain could not consider the kidnapping element of Whitley's single
criminal transaction. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 332; see infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text
(trial court constrained from considering elements not included in plea bargain agreement).
107. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 332.
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hearing related only to the crime described in subsection (d) with its respective
penalty scheme.'"5 In imposing the initial twenty year sentence, the district
court did not consider elements of the subsection (e) crime, kidnapping. 1' 9
Thus, when the district court, on Whitley's retrial, considered the evidence
in light of the kidnapping offense and penalty provision of subsection (e),
the court's imposition of a fifty year sentence did not deny Whitley due
process of law under the Pearce doctrine.110
While also agreeing with the Fourth Circuit that section 2113 creates.
greater and lesser included offenses and not a single offense with aggravating
circumstances, Judge Murnaghan argued in dissent that the Whitley court
should not apply this interpretation of section 2113 retroactively' In his dissen-
ting opinion, Judge Murnaghan asserted that when Whitley filed a 18 U.S.C. §
2255 motion to vacate his guilty plea, Whitley justifiably relied on existing
Fourth Circuit decisions holding that section 2113 creates merely one offense
with aggravating circumstances." 2 Consequently, when Whitley appealed his
plea bargain conviction, Judge Murnaghan contended that Whitley had ade-
quate reason to believe that the Pearce prophylactic rule would bar an increased
sentence if a jury convicted him on retrial for the same offense."13 Judge
Murnaghan concluded that due process of law prevented the Fourth Circuit
from creating, in effect, a judicial ex post facto law by interpreting section
2113 in a manner contradictory to the reading given the statute when Whitley
exercised his right to appeal."1
4
In addressing Judge Murnaghan's dissenting argument that the Fourth
Circuit violated Whitley's due process rights by creating a judicial ex post
facto law, the Fourth Circuit justifiably refused to accept the argument
because Whitley did not argue that he relied upon previous Fourth Circuit
precedent in appealing the plea bargain agreement." 5 As Rule 28(a)(4) of the
108. Id.; see supra note 9 (text of 18 U.S.C. § 2113).
109. See Whitley, 759 F.2d at 332; Klobuchir v. Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d 966, 969 (3d Cir.)
(acceptance of plea bargain constrains judge from considering greater offenses of indictment),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981).
110. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 331-32; see supra note 54 (stating district court's resentencing
comments in Whitley); supra notes 60-76 and accompanying text (Pearce due process consider-
ations do not bar increased sentence on greater included offense).
111. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 334-35 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
112. Id.; see infra note 119 (discussing Fourth Circuit interpretations of § 2113 at time
Whitley filed appeal).
113. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 334 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying
notes 24-25 (discussing Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Whitley that Pearce bars increased
sentence if § 2113 creates merely one offense).
114. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 336 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Whitley, Judge
Murnaghan argued that the Fourth Circuit violated Whitley's right to due process by creating
a new interpretation of an existing statute. Id.; see Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 316
(1972) (unforeseeable judicial construction of criminal statute violates due process of law);
Bowie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964) (inconsistent judicial construction of
criminal statute violated due process of law).
115. Sweetwine v. Maryland, 769 F.2d 991, 993 (4th Cir. 1985) (Murnaghan, J., concurring)
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Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure mandates, an appellant must present
the issues that the appellant wishes to litigate to the appellate court, supported
by appropriate judicial authority.1 6 In compliance with Rule 28(a)(4), the
majority of circuit courts of appeals have refused to decide any issues, such
as Judge Murnaghan's contention that the Fourth Circuit created a judicial
ex post facto law, that may have important significance but which the
defendant has not raised on appeal.' '7 The vitality of the adversarial system
of law in our country hinges on appellate courts sitting as neutral arbiters
of issues argued before them by counsel, and not on the courts sitting as a
board of self-initiated inquiry and research. 118 Even had Whitley's counsel
raised the issue at the en banc appeal, however, a review of the history of
the Fourth Circuit's treatment of section 2113 suggests that the Fourth
Circuit, prior to Whitley, consistently had not interpreted section 2113 either
as creating one offense or as creating greater and lesser included offenses.'19
(failure of appellant to argue issue on appeal constrains court from addressing issue). In
concurring with the Fourth Circuit in Sweetiwine v. Maryland, Judge Murnaghan conceded that
the Whitley court correctly refused to consider whether Whitley had relied on existing Fourth Circuit
precedent in appealing his guilty plea conviction. Id.
116. FED. R. App. P. 28(a)(4). Rule 28(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides, in pertinent part, that appellant's brief must contain an argument that represents all
contentions of the appellant concerning the issue presented before the court. Id. In addition,
appellant must support his arguments by citing authorities, statutes and relevant parts of the
record. Id.
117. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (refusing
to decide important issue not argued by party standing to benefit therefrom); Kemlon Prods.
& Dev. Co. v. United States, 646 F.2d 223, 224 (5th Cir.) (refusing to decide issue merely
mentioned by party when party did not discuss merits), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981);
Markowitz & Co. v. Toledo Metropolitan Hous. Auth., 608 F.2d 699, 707-08 (6th Cir. 1979)
(refusing to decide apparent issue not argued by either party); United States v. John Bernard
Indus., Inc., 589 F.2d 1353, 1362, n.5 (8th Cir. 1979) (refusing to decide issue merely mentioned
by party when party did not cite supporting authority); Caperton v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal
Co., 585 F.2d 683, 692 (4th Cir. 1978) (refusing to decide issue not mentioned by either party);
Harman v. Diversified Medical Inv. Corp., 524 F.2d 361, 365 (10th Cir. 1975) (refusing to
decide issue merely mentioned by party as conclusory argument unsupported by authority or
facts in record), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976); United States v. White, 454 F.2d 435, 439
(7th Cir. 1971) (refusing to decide issue not sufficiently briefed by parties to permit intelligent
argument before court), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 962 (1972).
118. Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
119. See Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329-31. In reviewing Fourth Circuit cases interpreting § 2113,
a careful analysis reveals that contrary to Judge Murnaghan's dissent, the Fourth Circuit had
not adopted a consistent interpretation of § 2113 prior to the time when Whitley filed a motion
to vacate his guilty plea. See id.; supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (discussing Judge
Murnaghan's dissent in Whitley). The Fourth Circuit initially construed § 2113 in United States
v. Lawrenson. United States v. Lawrenson, 298 F.2d 880, 888-89 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 913, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 947, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 962 (1962). In Lawrenson, a
jury convicted the defendant on count one of a four count indictment for taking property by
intimidation from a bank in violation of subsection (a) of § 2113. Id. at 881. The Fourth
Circuit opinion in Lawrenson provided conflicting language concerning the correct interpretation
of § 2113. See id. at 889. The Lawrenson court stated that the various subsections of § 2113
were not separate ways of describing the same offense, but instead constituted related offenses.
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Regardless of whether Whitley argued the ex post facto issue on appeal or
not, therefore, Whitley could not have justifiably relied on Fourth Circuit
precedent because the Fourth Circuit consistently had not interpreted section
2113 as creating merely one offense.'
20
In United States v. Whitley, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that the district court's conviction and imposition of an
increased sentence on retrial under the Federal Bank Robbery Act did not
violate the defendant's fifth amendment due process rights.'2, The Fourth
Circuit noted that the United States Supreme Court has held that due process
of law prevents courts motivated by judicial vindictiveness from meting out
increased sentences on retrial to prisoners that successfully have exercised
their right to appeal. 2 2 To prevent judicial vindictiveness against prisoners
Id. The Lawrenson court, however, also stated that the sentences under § 2113 increased with
the aggravation of the offense, thereby implying that the statute creates only one offense. Id.
The language used by the Fourth Circuit in Lawrenson, therefore, is too ambiguous to provide
a clear indication of whether § 2113 creates one offense, or greater and lesser included offenses.
See id. Addressing the interpretation of § 2113 ten years after Lawrenson, the Fourth Circuit
in Walters v. Harris read § 2113 as creating one offense with varying degrees of punishment
depending on whether aggravating circumstances were present. Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988,
994 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom., Wren v. United States, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973). In
Walters, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of an indictment charging the defendant
with robbery under subsection (a) of § 2113 and armed robbery under subsection (d). Id. at
994. The trial court in Walters imposed two 20 year concurrent sentences which the Fourth
Circuit found impermissible since § 2113 sanctioned sentencing on only the most aggravated
count. Id.
Apparently questioning the dicta in Walters, the Fourth Circuit in Crawford v. United
States concluded that subsections (d) and (e) of § 2113 may or may not establish independent
offenses. Crawford v. United States, 519 F.2d 347, 351-52 (4th Cir. 1975). In Crawford, the
defendant pleaded guilty to armed robbery in violation of subsection (d) of § 2113 and
kidnapping to avoid apprehension in violation of subsection (e). Id. at 348-49. The Crawford
court relied on precedent from the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits to hold that the distinction,
or similarity, between subsections (d) and (e) depends on the nature of the criminal transaction.
Id. at 351-32; see, e.g., United States v. Faleafine, 492 F.2d 18, 24-25 (9th Cir. 1974) (relationship
between 21 U.S.C. § 2113(d) and (e) turns on nature of criminal transaction); United States v.
Parker, 283 F.2d 862, 864 (7th Cir. 1960) (same), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 937 (1961); Clark v.
United States, 281 F.2d 230, 233 (10th Cir. 1960) (same). Thus, the Fourth Circuit in Crawford found
that if a kidnapping arises out of the robbery, subsection (e) merges with the crime of robbery
under subsection (d), but when the kidnapping arises out of avoiding apprehension or attempted
escape, subsection (e) creates a separate offense. Id.
120. See Whitley, 759 F.2d at 330-31; supra note 119 (discussing Fourth Circuit's incon-
sistent interpretations of § 2113). Since the Fourth Circuit inconsistently had interpreted §
2113 prior to the time Whitley exercised his appellate right, the defendant in Whitley could not
have predicted accurately the established precedent prevailing in the Fourth Circuit at the time
defendant raised his appeal. See Whitley, 759 F.2d at 330-31. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit did
not violate Whitley's due process rights by creating an inconsistent reading of an unambiguous
statute. See supra note 114 (due process bars inconsistent interpretation of unambiguous statute).
121. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 329; see supra notes 83-103 and accompanying text (Federal
Bank Robbery Act creates greater and lesser included offenses); supra notes 60-76 and accom-
panying text (increased sentence on retrial for greater included offenses does not violate due
process).
122. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 330; see Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725 (increased sentence on retrial
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appealing prior convictions, the Supreme Court has established that a
rebuttable presumption of judicial vindictiveness exists whenever a defendant
receives an increased sentence on retrial for the same offense. 23 In Whitley,
however, the Fourth Circuit found that the presumption of vindictiveness
did not apply because the jury, on retrial, did not convict the defendant of
the same offense to which the defendant earlier had pleaded guilty. 24 The
Fourth Circuit correctly found that the defendant pleaded guilty to armed
robbery under subsection (d) of section 2113, a lesser included offense of
the greater offense of kidnapping under subsection (e), which the jury convicted
the defendant of on retrial.' 25 Whitley conclusively makes evident that future
due process claims arising out of increased sentences imposed on retrial for
offenses in violation of section 2113 will succeed only if a defendant can
prove actual judicial vindictiveness. 26 The burden of proving actual judicial
vindictiveness, however, effectively precludes successful due process claims
for future Fourth Circuit defendants contemplating appeal of convictions
under section 2113.' 2 Consequently, Whitley serves as an excellent warning to
defendants who have successfully appealed convictions on lesser included
offenses, that upon retrial, prosecutors may use the original indictment and
imperil the defendant with increased sentences.
28
JAMES A. WACHTA
motivated by judicial vindictiveness violates prisoners' due process rights); supra notes 40-45
and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Pearce).
123. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1968); see supra note 45 and accom-
123. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725 (1968); see supra note 45 and accompanying text (Pearce pro-
phylactic rule prohibiting judicial vindictiveness); supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining analysis to detect judicial vindictiveness under Pearce prophylactic rule).
124. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 332; see supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text (discussing
Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Whitley).
125. Whitley, 759 F.2d at 331-32.
126. See Wasman v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3217, 3222 (1984) (defendant must conclu-
sively prove actual judicial vindictiveness when Pearce prophylactic rule does not apply); supra
note 52 (Supreme Court reluctance to expand Pearce beyond situation when court increases
sentence on retrial for same offense); supra notes 83-103 (retrial on various subsections of §
2113 is not for same offense).
127. See Wasman v. United States, 104 S. Ct. at 3221-23; supra note 44 at 399 n.25 (actual
judicial vindictiveness in retrial sentencing is extremely difficult to prove conclusively).
128. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 n.2 (1971) (defendant who attacks
plea bargain conviction must plead anew to original indictment); supra note 65 and accompa-
nying text (prosecutor must charge defendant with original indictment on retrial after vacated
guilty plea conviction).
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C. Expanding the Automobile Exception: Fourth Circuit Upholds
Warrantless Search of Parked Automobile Based Solely on Probable
Cause to Believe Vehicle Contained Contraband
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution safeguards an
individual's right to be free from all unreasonable searches and seizures.'
The individual's fourth amendment safeguards are applicable to searches
and seizures conducted by state officials through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.2 As a means of protecting the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures, the fourth amendment generally
requires that the federal government conduct all searches pursuant to a
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. 3 The United States Supreme Court,
however, has found that the fourth amendment does not always require that
police obtain a warrant prior to searching an automobile.4 The Supreme
Court has based the reduced fourth amendment warrant protection afforded
automobiles both on the automobile's inherent mobility and on an individ-
ual's reduced privacy interests in his automobile due to pervasive state
I. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in pertinent part that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id.
The fourth amendment expresses the First Congress' intent that courts will defend the rights of
the individual against unreasonable searches and seizures. I ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (1789). The
Supreme Court has stated that courts should construe tle provisions of the fourth amendment
liberally. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). The fourth amendment's requirement
that a magistrate issue a warrant based on probable cause mandates that the evidence presented
to a magistrate must furnish a fair probability that police will discover the articles sought.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983). The same standards of probable cause and
reasonableness apply to both federal and state officials. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33
(1963).
2. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). In Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme Court stated
that the fourth amendment protections as applied through the fourteenth amendment due
process clause mandate that state courts must exclude evidence seized in contravention of the
fourth amendment. Id.; see U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV (no state shall deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law); supra note 1 (text of fourth amendment).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g, Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350
(1972) (stating general proposition that fourth amendment requires warrant from neutral
magistrate). Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971) (same); Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958) (same); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948) (same); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (same); supra note 1 (text
of fourth amendment). But see Note, Reasonable Suspicion and Probable Cause in Automobile
Searches: A Validity Checklist for Police, Prosecutors, and Defense Attorneys, 40 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 361, 362 n.10 (1983) (articulating 13 exceptions to general rule that police must conduct
searches pursuant to procuring warrant).
4. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2070 (1985) (warrantless automobile
search does not violate fourth amendment because of automobile's inherent mobility and
reduced privacy interests under pervasive state regulatory schemes); Colorado v. Bannister, 449
U.S. 1, 2-3 (1980) (warrantless automobile search is valid because automobiles frequently contain
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regulation of motor vehicles.5 The Court has labeled the reduced constitu-
tional protection provided when police conduct an automobile search as the
"automobile exception" to the fourth amendment warrant requirement. 6
Historically, under the automobile exception, a court could validate a
warrantless search of an automobile when police had probable cause to
believe that a vehicle contained contraband and exigent circumstances made
the procurement of a warrant impractical.7 In United States v. $29,000-U.S.
Currency,8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
addressed the issue of whether probable cause to believe that an automobile
contains contraband justifies a warrantless search under the automobile
exception even though the automobile temporarily is parked on private
property.9
In $29,000, Agent Cummings of the North Carolina Bureau of Investi-
contraband); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 (1973) (warrantless auto-
mobile search is valid because of automobile's capability to escape jurisdiction of search
warrant); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 165 (1949) (warrantless automobile search is
valid because of automobile's use as repository of contraband); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (warrantless automobile search is valid because of automobile's use as
repository of illegal goods and automobile's capability to escape jurisdiction of search warrant).
5. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2070 (1985); see infra notes 47-48 (cases
applying dual justification to uphold warrantless vehicle searches under automobile exception).
6. See California v. Carniey, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2068-69 (1985) ("automobile exception"
is anomaly to general rule that police must procure warrant prior to conducting search); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (upholding warrantless search of automobile because
of reduced constitutional protection afforded inherently mobile vehicles). See generally Note,
The Warrantless Search of Closed Containers Under the Automobile Exception: United States
v. Ross, 24 B.C.L. REv. 1311, 1314-25 (1983) (discussing development of automobile exception
from Carroll to Ross); Note, The Development of the Law of Warrantless Searches, 68 CORNELL
L. RaV. 107, 107-15 (1982) (same); Comment, Search and Seizure: From Carroll to Ross, the
Odyssey of the Automobile Exception, 32 CATm. U.L. REv. 221, 225-59 (1982) (same); Moylan,
The Automobile Exception: What it is and What it is Not-A Rationale in Search of a Clearer
Label, 27 MERcER L. REv. 987, 987-1031 (1976) (discussing automobile exception to fourth amend-
ment warrant requirement).
7. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925) (upholding warrantless search of
automobile under automobile exception based on probable cause to believe vehicle contained
illegal whiskey); see infra note 47 (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Carroll). Some courts
have stated that all fourth amendment warrant exceptions, including the automobile exception,
derive from the presence of exigent circumstances. See Hornblower v. State, 351 So.2d 716,
718 (Fla. 1977) (exigent circumstances abrogate warrant requirement because of police need to
act expeditiously). In the context of warrantless automobile searches, exigent circumstances are
emergency situations in which the threat that an individual may lose, move, or destroy the
incriminating evidence sought, justifies police to act with celerity to secure the evidence without
a warrant. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 515 (5th ed. 1979); see also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 763 (1979) (requiring lower courts to assess existence of exigent circumstances at point just
prior to search); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977) (finding exigent circum-
stances when mobility of luggage created danger of ready flight to conceal evidence); Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595 (1974) (finding exigent circumstances when remote possibility
existed that wife might remove defendant husband's parked automobile from public lot).
8. 745 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1984).
9. Id. at 854.
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gation arranged to purchase marijuana at the residence of J.W. Lindsay. 0
Lindsay informed Agent Cummings that an automobile transporting mari-
juana would arrive in five minutes and back up to Lindsay's front porch."
Five minutes later Bruce Alan Schneider drove an automobile up to Lindsay's
porch.' Agent Cummings ordered surveillance units to close in and arrest
Lindsay and Schneider.'" Agent Cummings proceeded to open the trunk of
Schneider's automobile, which contained several bales of marijuana." Cum-
mings then closed the trunk and left Lindsay's residence to obtain a search
warrant.'I After obtaining a warrant, the officers conducted a thorough search
of Schneider's automobile. 16 In the trunk of Schneider's automobile, the of-
ficers found 187 pounds of marijuana and 29,000 dollars in cash.'
7
In an effort to obtain undisputed title to the 29,000 dollars found in
Schneider's automobile, the United States commenced an action pursuant to
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).8 Section 881(a)(6) of Title 21 of the United States
10. Id. In United States v. $29,000-U.S. Currency, Agent Cummings of the North
Carolina Bureau of Investigation negotiated with J.W. Lindsay to purchase 300 pounds of
marijuana. Id.
11. Id. In $29,000, prior to informing Agent Cummings that marijuana would arrive
shortly, J.W. Lindsay made a telephone call to B.A. Schneider in Agent Cummings' presence.
Id. Because Agent Cummings had no probable cause to believe Schneider's automobile would
be transporting the contraband prior to the telephone call, the police could not have procured
a warrant prior to Schneider's arrival at Lindsay's residence. See id.; see also Colorado v.
Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3 (1980) (constitutionality of warrantless search of automobile upheld
when probable cause developed only after routine stop for traffic violation); United States v.
Brennan, 538 F.2d 711, 721-22 (5th Cir.) (warrantless search of airplane upheld when police
obtained probable cause supporting informants tip only after aircraft taxied without lights),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1976); United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 867 (3d Cir. 1976)
(warrantless search of automobile held constitutional when police were ignorant of vehicle
transporting forthcoming narcotics); United States v. Upthegrove, 504 F.2d 682, 686 (6th Cir.
1974) (warrantless search of automobile found constitutional because police had no advance
information of vehicle description transporting forthcoming drugs).
12. $29,000, 745 F.2d at 854.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. In $29,000, Agent Cummings left other surveillance agents at the Lindsay residence
to guard B.A. Schneider's automobile while agent Cummings obtained a search warrant for the
vehicle. Id. In leaving agents to stand watch over the automobile, Agent Cummings followed
established Fourth Circuit precedent. See United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1103 (4th
Cir.) (posting guard while obtaining warrant is proper search procedure), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
895 (1974).
16. $29,000, 745 F.2d at 854.
17. Id. The State of North Carolina, in $29,000, prosecuted B.A. Schneider for possession
of marijuana with intent to sell and deliver. Id. at n.l. The North Carolina Superior Court sup-
pressed the marijuana and the $29,000 found in Schneider's trunk because, in the North Carolina
Court's opinion, the police found the marijuana and the money during an illegal search. Id.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision to suppress the evidence,
relying on the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Ross. Id.; see United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (permitting warrantless search of automobile when probable cause exists
to believe vehicle contains contraband); infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court's decision in Ross). Schneider appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court. Id. The
North Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari. Id.
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Code mandates forfeiture of currency obtained through the distribution of
a controlled substance.' 9 Schneider filed a motion for summary judgment on
the grounds that Agent Cummings' initial warrantless search of the auto-
mobile trunk violated Schneider's fourth amendment rights.20 The United
States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted
Schneider's motion for summary judgment and ordered the United States to
return the 29,000 dollars to Schneider. 2' The district court held that the
United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Ross, 22 in which
the Court upheld a warrantless search of an automobile stopped in transit,
requires police to obtain a search warrant whenever reasonably practical.
23
Because Agent Cummings arrested Schneider and Lindsay and police im-
mobilized the automobile, the district court found that no exigent circum-
stances existed to justify Cummings' warrantless search of Schneider's trunk.
24
19. Id. Under section 881(a)(6) of title 21 of the United States Code, all moneys used or
intended for use in the purchase of a controlled substance are subject to forfeiture .to the United
States. Id; see 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1982) (text of federal narcotics forfeiture statute). Section
881(a)(6) additionally states that all moneys used or intended for use in the facilitation of
purchasing a controlled substance are subject to forfeiture to the United States. $29,000, 745
F.2d at 854; see 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1982) (text of federal narcotics forfeiture statute).
Marijuana is a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(c)(10) (1982). Property forfeited under
section 881 of title 21 of the United States Code is not repleviable or recoverable by the
defendant, and is placed under the custody of the Attorney General. 21 U.S.C. § 881(c) (1982).
The Attorney General may dispose of the forfeited property by retaining the property for
official use, selling the property, placing the property under the custody of the General Services
Administration, or turning the property over to the appropriate state or local authority
responsible for apprehension of the forfeited goods. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(e) (WEST Supp. 1985).
Under section 88 1, the government has the initial burden of proving that probable cause justified
the forfeiture. United States v. $13,000-U.S. Currency, 733 F.2d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 1984). Once
the government establishes probable cause, the defendant must rebut the government's evidence
by showing lawful use of the property. Id.
20. $29,000, 745 F.2d at 854. In $29,000, B.A. Schneider argued that Agent Cummings'
initial warrantless search of Schneider's automobile violated Schneider's fourth amendment
rights. Id.; see supra note 1 (discussing fourth amendment protections). Schneider further argued
that since Agent Cummings obtained a search warrant based on observations made during the
initial search of the trunk, the Fourth Circuit should suppress the $29,000 uncovered in the
search carried out pursuant to the warrant as illegally tainted evidence under the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine. $29,000, 745 F.2d at 854; see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 488 (1963) (discussing fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine). In Wong Sun v. United States,
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the admissibility of evidence derived from unconsti-
tutional arrests. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. In holding that the exclusionary rule barred the
use of such evidence at trial, the Supreme Court in Wong Sun explained that any evidence
uncovered subsequent to a violation of an individual's constitutional rights is tainted by the
primary illegality of the initial police intrusion and is inadmissible. Id. at 487-88. The term
"fruit of the poisonous tree" designates the initial illegal search as the "poisonous tree," and
any evidence derived from the illegal search as the "fruit." See id.
21. See $29,000, 745 F.2d at 854 (district court in $29,000 did not issue written opinion)
22. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court's decision in Ross).
23. See $29,000, 745 F.2d at 854 (Fourth Circuit citing district court's unpublished decision
in $29,000).
24. See id. (Fourth Circuit citing district court's unpublished decision in $29,000).
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed and ordered that Schneider forfeit
the 29,000 dollars to the United States. 25 The Fourth Circuit in $29,000 held
that the probable cause to believe that Schneider's automobile contained
contraband justified Agent Cummings' warrantless search of the automo-
bile's trunk, and, therefore, the illegal search did not taint the subsequent
discovery of the 29,000 dollars. 26 The Fourth Circuit based its decision on
two similar but independent grounds-the automobile exception to the fourth
amendment warrant requirement 27 and the federal narcotics forfeiture stat-
ute.
2
In holding that the warrantless search of Schneider's automobile did not
violate Schneider's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures, the Fourth Circuit in $29,000 looked to United States v. Ross
for guidance in the proper application of the automobile exception. 29 The
Fourth Circuit reasoned that transporting contraband in an automobile
reduces the vehicle owner's expectation of privacy to the extent that a
warrantless search of the automobile is reasonable. 0 The $29,000 court
interpreted Ross as permitting a warrantless search of an automobile when
police can articulate objective facts establishing the existence of probable
cause that would be sufficient to justify a neutral magistrate's issuance of a
warrant.3 The $29,000 court further stated that the scope of a permissible
warrantless search of an automobile, conducted by police, is as exacting and
broad as if police actually had procured a warrant. 32 Since the police in
$29,000 had sufficient objective evidence to obtain a warrant to search
Schneider's automobile for contraband, and the scope of the search that
Agent Cummings conducted was no broader than a magistrate could have
authorized, the Fourth Circuit found no violation of Schneider's fourth
amendment rights.3 The defendant contended, however, that the automobile
-25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. See infra notes 30-33, 35-38 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's
reasoning in upholding warrantless search under automobile exception in $29,000).
28. $29,000, 745 F.2d at 855-56; see infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (discussing
Fourth Circuit's reasoning in upholding warrantless search under federal forfeiture statute in
$29,000).
29. $29,000, 745 F.2d at 854-55; see United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (apply-
ing automobile exception to warrant requirement when probable cause exists to believe vehicle
contains contraband); infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
decision in Ross). But see Wilson, The Warrantless Automobile Search: Exception Without
Justification, 32 HAsTiNGs L.J. 127, 130-37 (1980) (probable cause that automobile contains
contraband is insufficient to justify warrantless search without independent exigent circumstan-
ces); Note, The Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement: Speeding Away from the
Fourth Amendment, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 637, 666-67 (1980) (police should obtain warrant before
searching automobile whenever practical).
30. $29,000, 745 F.2d at 855.
31. Id.
32. See id. (scope of warrantless search under automobile exception is no narrower and
no broader than warrant authorized search) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823
(1982)).
33. $29,000, 745 F.2d at 855.
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exception did not apply in $29,000 because the police had immobilized the
automobile prior to the search.3 4 Relying on Supreme Court precedent,35 the
$29,000 court rejected the defendant's immobilization argument, finding that
once police trigger the application of the automobile exception by obtaining
sufficient probable cause, the immobilization of an automobile is irrelevant., 6
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the district court's finding that Ross
mandates procurement of a warrant whenever reasonably practical.317 The
Fourth Circuit focused on language in Ross suggesting that the reasonably
practical requirement does not apply when police have probable cause to
believe that a vehicle conceals incriminating evidence
s.3
In addition to the conclusion that the automobile exception justified the
warrantless search of Schneider's automobile, the $29,000 court validated
Agent Cummings' search on a similar but independent ground.39 The Fourth
Circuit interpreted 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) to authorize forfeiture to the United
States of the automobile Schneider used to transport the marijuana. 40 Section
881(a)(4) provides that all vehicles used to facilitate the transportation, sale,
receipt, possession or concealment of a controlled substance in violation of
federal narcotics laws are subject to forfeiture to the United States.42 Because
the police had probable cause to believe that Schneider's automobile con-
tained marijuana, the Fourth Circuit ruled that section 881 of title 21 of the
United States Code permitted the warrantless seizure of Schneider's auto-
mobile.42 The Fourth Circuit then held that since police made a valid seizure
of Schneider's automobile under Section 881, the fourth amendment did not
34. Brief for Appellant at 5, United States v. $29,000-U.S. Currency, 745 F.2d 853 (4th
Cir. 1984).
35. Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam) (absence of exigent
circumstances is irrelevant to validity of warrantless search of vehicle immobilized by police
under automobile exception); accord Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 382 (1984) (per
curiam) (police impoundment of vehicle is irrelevant to validity of subsequent warrantless search
under automobile exception).
36. $29,000, 745 F.2d at 855; see Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (percuriam);
infra note 44 (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Thomas).
37. $29,000, 745 F.2d at 855.
38. Id. The Fourth Circuit, in $29,000, cited the Ross opinion's holding that automobile
searches are excepted from the general rule that police must procure search warrants when
reasonably practical. Id., (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 807-08). In United States v. Ross, the Supreme
Court explained that police must have probable cause to believe that the automobile conceals
contraband before proceeding with a warrantless search under the automobile exception. Ross,
456 U.S. at 807-09.
39. See $29,000, 745 F.2d at 855-56 (upholding constitutionality of warrantless automobile
search under federal forfeiture statute).
40. Id.
41. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1982); see supra note 19 (discussing scope and application of
21 U.S.C. § 881).
42. $29,000, 745 F.2d at 855-56. The $29,000 court reasoned that police lawfully entered
J.W. Lindsay's property to arrest Lindsay and B.A. Schneider. Id. at 856. While on Lindsay's
property, the discovery of Schneider's automobile fell within the purview of the plain view
doctrine. Id.; see Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737-43 (1983) (holding police lawfully stopping
an automobile may seize item in plain view if officer obtained probable cause to believe item
[Vol. 43:431
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
require Agent Cummings to obtain a warrant before searching the automo-
bile.4
3
Under the automobile exception to the fourth amendment warrant
requirement, upon which the Fourth Circuit based its holding in $29,000, the
Supreme Court has validated warrantless searches of automobiles when police
had probable cause to believe that automobiles stopped in transit contained
contraband. 4 Additionally, the Supreme Court has validated warrantless
searches of automobiles when police had probable cause to believe that
contained contraband). Since the police had probable cause to believe that Schneider's auto-
mobile contained contraband and police complied with the tenets of the plain view doctrine,
the Fourth Circuit authorized seizure of the vehicle under the federal narcotics forfeiture statute,
21 U.S.C. § 881. $29,000, 745 F.2d at 856; see United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397, 400-01
(4th Cir. 1982) (21 U.S.C. § 881 authorizes immediate seizure of vehicles on less rigid probable
cause than required for warrantless search under automobile exception whenever vehicle owner
violates federal narcotics laws); supra note 19 (discussing scope and application of 21 U.S.C. § 881).
43. $29,000 745 F.2d at 856. In $29,000, the Fourth Circuit held that a vehicle lawfully
seized under the federal narcotics forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881, is subject to a subsequent
warrantless search by police. Id.; see Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 60-62 (1967) (authorizing
warrantless search of vehicle legally seized under state narcotics forfeiture statute resembling 21
U.S.C. § 881). The $29,000 court relied on the holdings of other United States Circuit Courts
of Appeals validating warrantless searches of vehicles lawfully seized. $29,000, 745 F.2d at 856
n.5; see, e.g, United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 370 (3d Cir. 1981) (explaining historical
development of forfeiture statutes authorizing seizures and searches of vehicles without process);
United States v. Kimak, 624 F.2d 903, 905-06 (9th Cir. 1980) (search of vehicle legally seized
pursuant to arrest is authorized under automobile exception to warrant requirement); United
States v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324, 331 (Ist Cir. 1979) (no judicial precedent precludes warrantless
search of vehicle lawfully seized); United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974) (21
U.S.C. § 881(b)(4) authorizes seizure and search of automobile without process as long as police
have probable cause to believe vehicle contains contraband), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975);
O'Reilly v. United States, 486 F.2d 208, 210-11 (8th Cir.) (Cooper authorizes search of vehicle
without process when police validly seize vehicle pursuant to arrest), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1043
(1973); United States v. Shye, 473 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (6th Cir. 1973) (authorizing warrantless
seizure and search of vehicle under automobile exception to fourth amendment warrant
requirement); United States v. Edge, 444 F.2d 1372, 1375 (7th Cir.) (construing federal
transportation forfeiture statute, 49 U.S.C. § 782, to authorize warrantless seizure and search
of automobile), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 855 (1971); United States v. Stout, 434 F.2d 1264, 1267
(10th Cir. 1970) (holding federal transportation forfeiture statute, 49 U.S.C. § 782, authorized
postal inspector to seize automobile transporting stolen money orders and to search vehicle
without process); United States v. McKinnon, 426 F.2d 845, 849-50 (5th Cir. 1970) (authorizing
warrantless seizure and search of automobiles under Florida state forfeiture statute).
44. See Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam). In Michigan v.
Thomas, police stopped an automobile in transit because the defendant driver failed to signal
before making a left turn. Id. at 259. Upon discovering an open bottle of beer in the passenger
compartment, police arrested the two occupants of the automobile and impounded the vehicle.
Id. An inventory search conducted before towing the automobile to police headquarters revealed
a revolver and two bags of marijuana. Id. at 260. The Court in Thomas relied on previous
Supreme Court applications of the automobile exception to uphold the legality of the warrantless
search, even though the automobile was immobile at the time of the search. Id. at 261; see
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (holding location and immobilization of.
automobile is irrelevant in warrantless search once probable cause exists to believe that vehicle
contains contraband); accord Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975) (plurality opinion)
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automobiles parked on public property contained evidence of a crime,45 and
when police had probable cause to believe that automobiles unoccupied and
impounded contained illegal evidence. 46 The Supreme Court based the justi-
fication for the automobile exception on the inherent mobility of the auto-
mobile, 47 and the fact that automobile owners have a reduced expectation of
(upholding warrantless search of immobilized vehicle on authority of Chambers); see infra note
46 (discussing Supreme Court's decisions in Chambers and White; see also United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (validating warrantless search of automobile stopped in transit by police
who had probable cause to believe vehicle contained contraband); infra notes 50-57 and accom-
panying text (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Ross).
45. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588-92 (1974) (plurality opinion). In Cardwell
v. Lewis, after arresting the defendant Lewis for murder, police impounded Lewis' automobile,
which Lewis parked in a public garage, to take tire and paint samples hoping to prove that Lewis
used the vehicle as a murder weapon. Id. at 586-88. The Supreme Court in Cardwell upheld
the warrantless search because automobiles function on municipal thoroughfares in the plain view
of the public, thus reducing expectations of privacy. Id. at 590; see Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (no legitimate expectation of privacy exists in what an individual willingly
exposes to public view). In addition, the Cardwell opinion stated that individuals seldom use
automobiles as a residence or a repository of personal effects. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590. The
Cardwell opinion concluded that the diminished expectations of privacy in an automobile remove
the rigorous warrant requirements of the fourth amendment. See id. at 590-92; see also Califor-
nia v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2070 (1985) (upholding warrantless search of motor home parked
on public property under automobile exception to warrant requirement), infra notes 68-72 and
accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's decision in Carney).
46. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970) (upholding warrantless search
of automobile even though search site was under police control). Acting on probable cause that
an automobile contained evidence of a robbery, the police in Chambers v. Maroney arrested
the occupants and impounded the vehicle. Id. at 44. A subsequent warrantless search of the
automobile at police headquarters revealed incriminating evidence. Id. The Supreme Court in
Chambers upheld the warrantless search of the automobile under the automobile exception,
finding the probable cause that the automobile contained contraband at the time police seized
the vehicle still obtained at the police station. Id. at 52; see also Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67,
68 (1975) (plurality opinion) (upholding warrantless search of immobilized vehicle on authority
of Chambers). In Texas v. White, police impounded an unoccupied automobile parked on a
public street and conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle at the police stationhouse. Id.
at 67-68. The Supreme Court refused to distinguish White, in which police seized the automobile
in broad daylight, from Chambers, in which police impounded the automobile at night. See id.
at 68-69. See generally Latzer, Searching Cars and Their Contents: United States v. Ross, 18
C~iM. L. BULL. 381, 384-86 (1982) (Chambers and White are evidence that Supreme Court
stretched inherent mobility justification of automobile exception to breaking point); Note,
Misstating the Exigency Rule: The Supreme Court v. the Exigency Requirement in Warrantless
Automobile Searches, 28 SYRAcusE L. REV. 981, 992-93, 1002 (1977) (Chambers and White are
evidence that inherent mobility of automobile alone is sufficient justification for Supreme Court
to apply automobile exception).
47. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (upholding warrantless
automobile search by federal prohibition agents because automobile is inherently mobile). Acting
on probable cause to believe that a certain automobile concealed illegal whiskey, the federal
agents in Carroll v. United States conducted an extensive warrantless search and found 68
bottles of bootlegged liquor after tearing open the automobile's upholstery. Id. at 136. The
Carroll opinion validated the warrantless search on the ground that the fourth amendment
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply with equal force to immobile
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privacy in their vehicles stemming from pervasive state regulation of motor
vehicles .
48
The dual justification for the application of the automobile exception
played a significant role in the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v.
Ross. 49 In Ross, police received a tip from a reliable informant that a man
named Bandit was selling narcotics and that Bandit stored the narcotics in
the trunk of his automobile. 0 Upon identifying Bandit's automobile, police
checked the automobile's license plates and discovered that Albert Ross
owned the vehicle. 5" After a brief observation, police determined that Ross,
the driver of the automobile under suspicion, matched the informant's
description of Bandit5 2 The police stopped the vehicle and conducted a
warrantless search of the passenger compartment and trunk. 3 In the trunk,
police found a paper sack that contained several glassine bags of powdered
heroin, and a zippered pouch that contained 3200 dollars. 4 In finding that
premises and inherently mobile vehicles. Id. at 153. The Supreme Court in Carroll reasoned
that an automobile's inherent mobility creates exigent circumstances, which makes the police's
securing of a warrant impractical. Id. at 156. In aiding effective law enforcement by abrogating
the warrant requirement when impractical, the Carroll opinion relied on congressional guidance
recognizing the importance of removing barriers to police searching vehicles transporting
contraband. Id. at 149-56.
48. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2070 (1985) (upholding warrantless
search of automobile because automobiles are inherently mobile and motor vehicles are subject
to pervasive state regulatory schemes); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976)
(upholding warrantless search of automobile because automobiles are inherently mobile and motor
vehicles are subject to periodic official inspections); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)
(plurality opinion) (upholding warrantless search of automobile because automobiles are inherently
mobile and motor vehicles function in plain view on public thoroughfares); Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433, 440-43 (1973) (upholding warrantless search of automobile because automobiles
are inherently mobile and motor vehicles are subject to state registration and licensing requirements).
See generally Gardner, Search and Seizure of Automobiles and Their Contents: Fourth Amend-
ment Considerations in a Post-Ross World, 62 NEB. L.R. 1, 9-13 (1983) (discussing diminished
privacy interest justification for application of automobile exception). But see generally Latzer,
supra note 46, at 387 (diminished privacy interest justification for application of automobile ex-
ception is without merit).
49. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982) (individual has no expectation of
privacy in inherently mobile automobile when police conduct warrantless searcl of automobile
based on probable cause to believe vehicle contains contraband).
50. Id. at 800-01.
51. Id. at 800.
52. Id. In United States v. Ross, while investigating an informant's tip that a man named
Bandit stored narcotics in the trunk of Bandit's maroon Malibu automobile, police found the
Malibu parked on a public street. Id. After checking the Malibu's license plates though the
Registry of Motor Vehicles and finding that no one near the parked Malibu matched the
informant's description of Bandit, the police drove around the block. Id. Upon returning to
the location of the Malibu, the officers observed that a caucasian male was driving the automobile.
Id. at 801. The police proceeded to follow the automobile and eventually determined that the
occupant, Albert Ross, matched the physical description of Bandit. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. In Ross, after police initially discovered a bag containing heroin in the trunk of
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the search did not violate the fourth amendment prohibition against unrea-
sonable searches, the Ross opinion stated that the inherent mobility of the
automobile" and the use of the automobile as a repository of contraband
5 6
justified the warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle. The Supreme
Court further held that the scope of the permissible search extended to all
areas and containers where police reasonably could find the contraband.
5 7
In holding that the Supreme Court's opinion in Ross is the controlling
case in deciding whether a warrantless automobile search is reasonable, the
Fourth Circuit in $29,000 joined the majority of the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals who have interpreted Ross as permitting warrantless
searches of vehicles under the automobile exception whenever police obtain
probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband.58 In so doing,
the Fourth Circuit in $29,000 correctly validated Agent Cummings' warrant-
less search of Schneider's automobile. 9 In both $29,000 and Ross, police
Albert Ross' automobile, the officers impounded the vehicle. Id. Pursuant to a second search
conducted at police headquarters, the police found a pouch containing $3200. Id.
55. Id. at 805-06.
56. Id. at 806.
57. Id. at 820-22. In extending the permissible scope of a warrantless search under the
automobile exception to include all containers in which the vehicle reasonably could contain
contraband, the Supreme Court in Ross reasoned that the practical considerations justifying the
application of the automobile exception-that is, preventing flight of the contraband and
promoting effective law enforcement-operate to justify searching all containers within the
vehicle. Id. at 802 n.28. To hold otherwise, concluded the Ross opinion, would only exacerbate
police intrusions on privacy interests by forcing officials to search parts of an automobile
beyond containers in which the officials have probable cause to believe contain the contraband.
Id.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 596 (1985) (upholding warrantless
search of truck under automobile exception based on probable cause to believe vehicle contained
marijuana); United States v. Marin, 761 F.2d 426, 430-33 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding warrantless
search of automobile passenger compartment under automobile exception based on probable
cause to believe vehicle contained contraband); United States v. Elkins, 732 F.2d 1280, 1286 (6th
Cir. 1984) (upholding warrantless search of automobile under automobile exception based on
probable cause to believe vehicle contained marijuana); United States v. Schecter, 717 F.2d 864,
869-71 (3d Cir. 1983) (upholding warrantless search of automobile trunk under automobile
exception based on probable cause to believe vehicle contained cocaine); United States v.
Williams, 714 F.2d 777, 780-82 (8th Cir. 1983) (upholding warrantless search of automobile
passenger compartment under automobile exception based on probable cause to believe vehicle
contained evidence of prior bank robbery); United States v. Rollins, 699 F.2d 530, 534 (1lth
Cir.) (upholding warrantless search of airplane under automobile exception based on probable
cause to believe airplane contained illicit narcotics), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983); United
States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066, 1074 (2d Cir. 1982) (upholding warrantless search of automobile
trunk under automobile exception based on probable cause to believe vehicle contained assorted
drugs), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983). But see United States v. Barbin, 743 F.2d 256, 259-
60 (5th Cir. 1984) (upholding warrantless search of sailboat under extended border search
exception based on probable cause to believe vehicle contained marijuana but rejected alternate
justification under automobile exception because of possibility of police to obtain telephone
warrant).
59. See $29,000, 745 F.2d at 855 (holding Ross permits warrantless search of automobile
based solely on police obtaining probable cause to believe automobile contains contraband).
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had probable cause to believe that the trunk of a particular automobile
contained a large quantity of marijuana.60 Similarly, in each case, to prevent
possible flight of the incriminating evidence, police acted reasonably in
apprehending the drug dealers and searching the automobiles without a
warrant. 6' As the Supreme Court in Ross correctly stated, to mandate that
police obtain a warrant in searches of automobiles engaged in the transpor-
tation of illegal goods would be impractical.62 Thus, the Supreme Court's
holding, which permits warrantless police searches of automobiles concealing
contraband, effectively reduces the possibility that an inherently mobile vehi-
cle may escape the jurisdiction of a warrant before police can obtain the war-
rant from a neutral magistrate.
6 3
In applying the holding of Ross to permit the warrantless search of a
parked automobile in $29,000, the Fourth Circuit remained consistent with
the court's previous decisions that have interpreted Ross to create no
distinction between warrantless searches of vehicles parked and vehicles in
transit. 64 The Ross opinion, however, is unclear concerning whether the
60. See id. at 854-55; Ross, 456 U.S. at 801.
61. Compare supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text (relevant facts concerning war-
rantless search of defendant's automobile in $29,000) with supra notes 50-54 and accompanying
text (relevant facts concerning warrantless search of defendant's automobile in Ross).
62. Ross, 456 U.S. at 806.
63. See id. In determining that police effectively may prevent the loss or destruction of
illegal evidence by conducting warrantless automobile searches under the automobile exception,
the Supreme Court in Ross stated that historically, individuals engaged in using vehicles to
transport contraband are aware that their vehicles are subject to official warrantless searches
whenever police obtain probable cause to believe that the individual's vehicle conceals contraband.
Id. at 806 n.8. The Ross opinion concluded that the need to prevent the possibility of an
individual moving the contraband outweighed any right the individual may have to continue on
his journey without official interference. Id. at 807 n.9.
64. See United States v. Poole, 718 F.2d 671, 675 (4th Cir. 1983) (upholding warrantless
search of automobile containing contraband under automobile exception to warrant requirement);
United States v. Shephard, 714 F.2d 316 322-23 (4th Cir. 1983) (upholding warrantless search
of automobile exception to warrant requirement), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 938. Acting on a reliable
informant's tip that the defendant illegally bottled and transported whiskey, the police in United
States v. Shephard observed the defendant place several plastic jugs into the trunk of his automobile.
Shephard, 714 F.2d at 317. Police then moved in and searched the trunk of the automobile find-
ing 38 one gallon jugs of moonshine. Id. In rejecting Shephard's argument that the automobile
exception is not applicable to a parked vehicle on private property, the Fourth Circuit held that
even though an individual may have a greater expectation of privacy in a parked vehicle than
in a vehicle in transit, the inherent mobility of an automobile in which police have probable
cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband outweighs any privacy interests. Id. at 322.
In United States v. Poole, the Fourth Circuit, in a later case similar to Shephard, again upheld
a warrantless search of an automobile parked on private property. Poole, 718 F.2d at 674-75.
In Poole, police observed a transfer of marijuana between the trunks of two automobiles parked
in the defendant's driveway. Id. at 673. As one automobile drove away, police stopped the
vehicle and searched the trunk pursuant to the driver's consent and found marijuana residue. Id.
Obtaining a search warrant based on the marijuana residue evidence, police returned to the
defendant's residence and searched the trunk of the defendant's automobile, finding a large
quantity of marijuana. Id. Although the district court subsequently invalidated the search
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Supreme Court intended Ross to authorize warrantless searches of a parked
vehicle based solely on probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains
contraband. 65 Nevertheless, the recent Supreme Court decision in California
v. Carney6 6 supports the Fourth Circuit's interpretation that Ross applies
equally to stationary vehicles as well as vehicles in transit.
6 7
In Carney, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officers, acting on an
informant's tip that the occupant of a motor home traded marijuana for
sex, staked out the motor home which the owner had parked in a public
lot.68 DEA agents stopped and questioned a youth who had just visited the
vehicle.69 The youth admitted that Carney, the vehicle's occupant, had given
the youth marijuana in exchange for sexual contacts.7 0 The DEA agents then
conducted a warrantless search of the motor home, uncovering marijuana
and various drug paraphernalia. 71 The Supreme Court upheld the warrantless
search of Carney's motor home.
72
In validating the warrantless motor home search, the Supreme Court in
Carney reasoned that the use of a state regulated vehicle on the public
thoroughfares abrogates the vehicle owner's constitutional protection against
warrantless searches. 73 Since vehicles readily are moveable and vehicle owners
are aware of the diminished privacy associated with their vehicles 7 4 the Supreme
Court concluded that conducting warrantless searches of vehicles optimally
serve society's interests.7 The Supreme Court in Carney, however, stopped
short of making probable cause a talisman to validate warrantless automobile
warrant based on a technical defect, the Fourth Circuit upheld the search under the automobile
exception. Id. at 674-75. The Poole court reasoned that once police obtained probable cause to
believe that the defendant's automobile contained contraband, the exigency of the situation
justified the warrantless search under the automobile exception. See id. at 675.
65. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 823; 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7.2 (Supp. 1985)
(concluding Ross holding should apply to permit warrantless searches of parked vehicles under
automobile exception); W. RINEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 11.3
(1985) (suggesting Ross holding may be broad enough to permit warrantless searches of parked
vehicles under automobile exception).
66. 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
67. See id. at 2069-71.
68. Id. at 2067.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. In California v. Carney, during the initial warrantless search, DEA agents
discovered marijuana, plastic bags, and a measurement scale on a table within the motor home.
Id. A subsequent search yielded additional marijuana in the refrigerator and cupboards. Id.
72. Id. at 2070-71.
73. Id. at 2069-70.
74. Id. at 2070; see supra note 63 (automobile owners are aware that using vehicle for
illegal purpose subjects automobile to warrantless search).
75. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2071. In holding that warrantless searches under the automobile
exception promote societal interests in having effective law enforcement, the Supreme Court in
Carney stated that the public is fully aware that the compelling need for governmental regulation
of motor vehicles results in citizens having less privacy in their vehicles than in their homes. Id.
at 2070-71. Consequently, the Court in Carney reasoned that because privacy interests in vehicles
must yield to the authority of various official searches that do not require the prior approval
of a magistrate, a warrantless vehicle search under the automobile exception is no more of an
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searches in every situation.76 The Carney opinion provided that the Supreme
Court will acknowledge legitimate expectations of privacy in automobiles
under certain circumstances.7 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Carney gave
no guidance concerning when a vehicle owner legitimately may claim an
enhanced privacy interest in an automobile that would be sufficient to
demand the rigorous application of the fourth amendment warrant require-
ment. 78 Circumstances affording a legitimate privacy interest in a vehicle
requiring a search warrant may include those in which police search a suspect's
immobile automobile that was sitting up on blocks in the suspect's driveway,
or search an automobile parked in a suspect's garage when the suspect uses
part of the garage as a bona fide business office. Additionally, a legitimate
privacy interest in a vehicle may exist in an automobile parked in an enclosed car
port if the automobile's owner did not register the vehicle for travel on the
public roadways. The Carney opinion, however, addressed only the issue of
whether police may conduct a warrantless search of a motor vehicle properly
suspected of containing contraband when the vehicle is parked on public
property. 79 The Supreme Court did not state that Carney applies to validate
warrantless searches of automobiles momentarily parked on private property,
as in $29,000.10 Consequently, the issue in $29,000 becomes whether, under
previous Supreme Court interpretations of the automobile exception, Schnei-
der possessed an enhanced privacy interest because Schneider parked his
automobile in Lindsay's driveway.
In finding that Schneider had no enhanced privacy interests in parking
his automobile in Lindsay's driveway, the Fourth Circuit correctly refused
to apply the Supreme Court's decision in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,8 in
which the Supreme Court invalidated a warrantless search of an automobile
parked on the owner's private property.82 In Coolidge, police arrested the
defendant for murder. 83 Thereafter, police impounded an automobile parked
on the defendant's residential property and conducted a warrantless search
invasion of privacy than if conducted pursuant to a warrant. Id. Additionally, to protect the
community from the evils of illicit substances, the courts must ensure that privacy interests do
not burden unduly law enforcement officials in their efforts to ferret out and prosecute criminal
activities. See id. The Supreme Court in Carney concluded that upholding warrantless searches
of vehicles believed to contain contraband under the automobile exception alleviates society's
concerns while protecting genuine fourth amendment privacy interests. Id.




79. Id. See United States v. Bagley, 765 F.2d 836, 844 (9th Cir. 1985) (interpreting Carney
to permit warrantless vehicle search based solely on probable cause to believe vehicle contains
contraband only if vehicle is parked in public place).
80. Compare Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070 (valid warrantless search of vehicle parked on
public property) with $29,000, 745 F.2d at 854-55 (valid warrantless search of vehicle temporarily
parked on private property).
81. 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion).
82. Id. at 458-64.
83. Id. at 447.
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of the automobile at police headquarters." The police in Coolidge, however,
did not have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband,
the defendant could not take flight himself, and no confederates-at-large waited
to remove the vehicle from the defendant's property. 85 In invalidating the
warrantless search, the Supreme Court distinguished Coolidge from previous
automobile exception cases because the particular automobile involved in
Coolidge was immobile.86 The Supreme Court stated that police should have
procured a warrant because to do so would have been reasonably practical.1
7
The Fourth Circuit properly distinguished Coolidge from $29,000 by
noting that Coolidge was not a case involving the warrantless search of an
automobile containing contraband." In addition, the Fourth Circuit may have
further factually distinguished Coolidge from $29,000.19 In Coolidge, police
seized the automobile on the defendant's own private property, the police
did not search the automobile at the time of the defendant's arrest, and the
destruction of evidence seized from the Coolidge automobile was a remote
risk.90 Conversely, in $29,000, police seized Schneider's automobile on an-
other individual's private property rather than Schneider's own private land,
the police searched Schneider's automobile immediately at the time of
Schneider's arrest, and Agent Cummings had no information pertaining to
confederates of Schneider or Lindsay who might have destroyed the mari-
juana while Agent Cummings procured a warrant. 9'
A recent opinion in the First Circuit, United States v. Moscatiello,
92
supports the Fourth Circuit's refusal to apply Coolidge to the facts of
$29,000. The First Circuit in Moscatiello refused to find an enhanced
expectation of privacy in an automobile parked on another individual's
private property.93 In Moscatiello, federal agents with probable cause to
believe that several individuals conspired to distribute illegal narcotics made
a warrantless search of the defendant's truck while the vehicle remained
stationary on another individual's property. 94 In rejecting a per se private/
84. Id. at 447-48.
85. Id. at 460-62.
86. Id. at 461-64.
87. Id.
88. See $29,000, 745 F.2d at 855 (distinguishing facts of Coolidge from facts of Ross
because Coolidge automobile was not used for illegal purposes nor believed to contain contra-
band). Compare Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 460-62 (facts of Coolidge) with Ross, 456 U.S. at 800-
01 (facts of Ross).
89. Compare infra text accompanying note 90 (summarizing facts of Coolidge) with infra
text accompanying note 91 (summarizing facts of $29,000).
90. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 460-62; supra text accompanying notes 83-87 (discussing
facts of Coolidge).
91. See $29,000, 745 F.2d at 854; supra text accompanying notes 10-17 (discussing facts
of $29,000).
92. 771 F.2d 589 (Ist Cir. 1985).
93. Id. at 599-600.
94. Id. at 595-96. In United States v. Moscatiello, federal agents conducted an investiga-
tion of suspected narcotic conspirators for approximately one year before making arrests. Id.
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public property distinction in the *application of the automobile exception,
the Moscatiello court held that a temporary stopover on another's property
is analogous to parking the vehicle on public property. 95 The First Circuit
concluded that the decision in Carney validated the warrantless search
because a defendant who parks his automobile on another individual's private
property gains no greater expectation of privacy than if the defendant instead
had parked his automobile in a public lot.
96
In refusing to distinguish between automobiles parked and automobiles
in transit when applying the automobile exception to the fourth amendment
warrant requirement, the Fourth Circuit in $29,000 correctly followed the
Supreme Court opinions in Ross and Carney.97 The dual justification for the
application of the automobile exception-the inherent mobility of automobiles
and reduced expectations of privacy-apply equally to automobiles in all
situations when police have probable cause to believe that an automobile
contains contraband.98 Under the automobile exception as defined by the
Supreme Court, police with the requisite probable cause may conduct war-
rantless searches of automobiles regardless of whether police stop an auto-
mobile in transit, search a parked automobile on public property, or impound
an automobile prior to searching the vehicle.99 In all three situations, the
societal interest in keeping contraband out of the community supports the
Supreme Court's decisions that validate the search.' °° Merely stopping an
automobile on another individual's driveway, where the vehicle is readily
at 591. While conducting a surveillance of a large warehouse suspected as the storage site for
the narcotics, DEA agents observed a white pick up truck exit the building. Id. at 595. The DEA
agents discretely followed the truck, which pulled into and parked in the driveway of a private
residence. Id. As the driver of the truck, defendant John Rooney, got out of the vehicle, the
agents moved in and arrested Rooney. Id. While arresting Rooney, the DEA agents smelled an
odor resembling marijuana eminating from the truck and immediately conducted a warrantless
search of the vehicle finding 60 bales of the illicit substance. Id.
95. Id. at 599-600. In Moscatiello, the First Circuit distinguished defendant Rooney's
reliance on Coolidge primarily because in Coolidge police searched a vehicle parked on the
owner's own property. Id. at 600; see Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 461; supra text accompanying
notes 83-87 (discussing facts of Coolidge).
96. Moscatiello, at 599-600; see Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070-71 (authorizing warrantless
search of motor home because vehicle parked in public lot is not afforded legitimate privacy
interests).
97. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (Supreme Court's reasoning in Ross for
permitting warrantless vehicle searches under automobile exception to warrant requirement);
supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (Supreme Court's reasoning in Carney for permitting
warrantless vehicle searches under automobile exception to warrant requirement).
98. See supra notes 47-48 (discussing dual justification for upholding warrantless vehicle
searches under automobile exception).
99. See supra note 44 (validating warrantless searches of automobiles stopped in transit
under automobile exception); supra note 45 (validating warrantless searches of automobiles
parked on public property under automobile exception); supra note 46 (validating warrantless
searches of impounded automobiles under automobile exception).
100. See Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070-71; see supra note 75 (discussing societal interests
validated when courts uphold warrantless searches under automobile exception).
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accessible from the public street, should not trigger any additional fourth
amendment protection against warrantless searches because parking on an-
other's land simply creates no enhanced expectation of privacy which society
is willing to legitimize.' 0 l Even under the Coolidge opinion, the vitality of
which is suspect after the Supreme Court's adoption of the dual justification
for the automobile exception,10 2 the Supreme Court plurality emphasized
many supporting factors contributing to the unreasonableness of the police
search in finding the warrantless automobile search invalid. 03 In $29,000,
however, Schneider simply could not demonstrate any factors elevating his
expectations of privacy by parking his automobile in Lindsay's driveway.'
4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in $29,000
held that when police obtain probable cause to believe that an automobile
parked on another individual's private property contains contraband, the of-
ficers may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle under the automobile
exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement. 0° The Fourth Cir-
cuit emphasized the Supreme Court's finding that the use of an automobile
to transport contraband abrogates the general rule that police must obtain
a search warrant when reasonably practicable. 06 After $29,000, no distinc-
tion exists in the Fourth Circuit between an automobile in transit and an
automobile immobilized for purposes of police conducting a warrantless vehi-
cle search under the automobile exception. 7 The $29,000 court's decision sup-
ports the public policy interest, enunciated by the Supreme Court, of keeping
contraband narcotics off of the community streets.' 8 The Fourth Circuit's
101. See Moscatiello, 771 F.2d. at 599-600 (holding no privacy interest distinction between
automobile parked on street and automobile parked in another individual's driveway).
102. See RINGEL, supra note 65 (questioning continued vitality of Coolidge holding that
invalidated warrantless search of parked automobile on private property); Gardner, supra note
48, at 35 (automobile exception is now talisman making fourth amendment warrantrequirement
obsolete in warrantless searches of automobiles); Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of
Automobiles and the Supreme Court From Carroll to Cardwell: Inconsistency Through the
Seamless Web, 53 N.C.L. REv. 722, 747 (1975) (suggesting fourth amendment warrant require-
ment may be inapplicable to automobiles).
103. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 460-62; see supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court's decision in Coolidge).
104. See $29,000, 745 F.2d at 855 (distinguishing facts of Coolidge from facts of $29,000
because defendant in Coolidge did not use automobile for illegal purposes and police in Coolidge
did not believe vehicle contained contraband); supra text accompanying notes 90-91 (distinguish-
ing facts of Coolidge from facts of $29,000 because police in Coolidge did not seize automobile
from another individual's private property nor seize vehicle pursuant to defendant's arrest).
105. $29,000, 745 F.2d at 855-56; see supra text accompanying note 31 (stating Fourth
Circuit's holding in $29,000).
106. $29,000, 745 F.2d at 855-56; see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing
Fourth Circuit's reliance in $29,000 on Supreme Court's decision in Ross).
107. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (arguing no distinction exists between
mobile and immobile vehicles for application of automobile exception).
108. See Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070-71; supra note 75 (discussing societal interests validated
when courts uphold warrantless searches under automobile exception).
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